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FREE SPEECH & DISPARAGING 
TRADEMARKS 
NED SNOW* 
Abstract: Speech law has silenced trademark. In In re Tam, the Federal Circuit 
ruled that the First Amendment requires Congress to grant trademark protection 
for disparaging speech. More specifically, the Federal Circuit held unconstitu-
tional the provision of the Federal Lanham Act that denies trademark protection 
for marks that disparage. The Federal Circuit’s ruling, however, is not the final 
word on the issue. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear the Tam case. This Ar-
ticle argues against the Federal Circuit decision. As illustrated by the five differ-
ent opinions from the en banc panel, the complexities of speech law easily lead 
to disparate conclusions, any one of which may seem reasonable. Yet if there is 
one principle of speech law that is certain, it is this: context is dispositive. The 
context of trademark law is particularly nuanced, so a failure to account for that 
context easily produces inconsistencies in the application of speech law’s doc-
trine and policy. Tellingly, none of the Federal Circuit’s five opinions consider 
the context of trademark law. None consider whether the majority’s holding is 
consistent with trademark’s most fundamental doctrines. None recognize that 
trademark law imposes other content-based criteria as conditions for protection, 
and has done so for over a century. The Tam majority merely applied speech law 
to the narrow provision under consideration, failing to account for the broader 
context of trademark law. This Article provides that context. The Article con-
cludes that the context of trademark law implies the constitutionality of the 
Lanham Act’s anti-disparagement provision . 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue of whether a disparaging mark may receive federal trade-
mark protection has received much attention in the past year. Courts, schol-
ars, and the public continue to ask the simple question: Will the Redskins 
lose their trademark?1 For the past seventy years, the Lanham Act has 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2016, Ned Snow. All rights reserved. 
 * Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. 
 1 See Pro Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 112 F.Supp.3d 439, 
450 (E.D. Va. 2015); Final Opening Brief of Appellant at 2, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, No. 15-
1874 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 2016); Rebecca Tushnet, The First Amendment Walks into a Bar: Trademark 
Registration and Free Speech, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2745016, *1-2 [https://perma.cc/Q2KL-CKXA]; Jay Caspian Kang, Dan Snyder and the 
Redskins Take a Loss, NEW YORKER (June 18, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/dan-snyder-and-the-redskins-take-a-loss [https://perma.cc/SY7J-WFZ9]; Pete Williams, Red-
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barred trademark registration for marks that “disparage,”2 and the Patent 
and Trademark Office (“PTO”) has accordingly denied trademark protection 
for marks such as REDSKINS on the grounds that the marks disparage ra-
cial or other groups.3 Yet in In re Tam, the Federal Circuit held that the anti-
disparagement provision of the Lanham Act is unconstitutional on free-
speech grounds, reversing decades of its own precedent.4 The Supreme 
Court has granted a petition for certiorari on the issue.5 
Analyzing the Lanham Act’s anti-disparagement provision under the 
First Amendment raises particularly difficult questions, both because speech 
law is so complex and because trademark law is so nuanced. The uncertain-
ty that surrounds the intersection of free speech and trademark law is exem-
plified in Tam, in which an en banc panel produced five different opinions.6 
The five opinions set forth different interpretations of free-speech jurispru-
dence, all of which seem well reasoned and thorough, yet all of which reach 
disparate conclusions.7 One crucial element, however, was missing in all the 
opinions. None of the judges considered whether the majority’s holding is 
consistent with the rest of trademark law.8 None of the judges accounted for 
the context of trademark in applying speech law, and in speech law, context 
is everything.9 Because the context of trademark law is particularly nu-
                                                                                                                           
skins Ruling Could Stick This Time, Say Trademark Experts, NBC NEWS (June 18, 2014, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/sports/redskins-ruling-could-stick-time-say-trademark-experts-n13
4781 [https://perma.cc/57JC-KVSD]. 
 2 See Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012). 
 3 Blackhorse v. Pro Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 
7, 2013). 
 4 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 1587871 (U.S. Sept. 29, 
2016) (No. 15-1293). Compare In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (ruling the anti-disparagement criterion of the Lanham Act does not violate the First 
Amendment), In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (same), and In 
re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (same), with In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1327–28 
(holding that First Amendment does not allow the government to refuse to register disparaging 
marks because it disapproves of the expressive messages conveyed by the marks). 
 5 See Lee v. Tam, No. 15-1293, 2016 WL 1587871 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2016); Eugene Volokh, 
Federal Appeals Court Decides ‘the Slants’ Case, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/22/federal-appeals-court-decides-the-
slants-case-excluding-disparaging-marks-from-trademark-registration-violates-the-first-amendment/ 
[https://perma.cc/BL95-8B67] (“Moreover, because the court has struck down part of a federal 
statute, the Supreme Court will likely agree to consider the case (if the government asks it to); so 
this isn’t the final word on the matter.”). 
 6 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1327–58; id. at 1358–63 (O’Malley, J., concurring); id. at 1363–
74 (Dyk, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 1374–76 (Lourie, J., dissenting); id. at 1376–82 
(Reyna, J., dissenting). 
 7 See id. at 1321 (majority opinion). 
 8 See id. 
 9 See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“But the character of every act 
depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. The most stringent protection of free speech 
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anced, a failure to account for that context in applying speech law easily 
produces inconsistencies in doctrine and policy. Those inconsistencies are 
apparent in the Tam majority opinion. 
Perhaps the most evident inconsistency between trademark law and the 
majority opinion is the fact that trademark law recognizes other content-
based criteria as conditions for trademark registration and has done so for 
more than a century.10 The requirements that a mark be distinctive and non-
deceptive, for instance, are well-established content-based restrictions that 
have never created a problem with speech law.11 Similarly, the Lanham 
Act’s exclusion of trademark protection for government symbols—core pro-
tected political speech—presents no First Amendment problem.12 None of 
the judges discussed this. The judges merely applied speech law to the nar-
row provision under consideration, without considering the broader context 
of trademark law. This Article provides that context.13 
The context of trademark law undermines four premises that are essen-
tial to the majority holding. The first premise is that the anti-disparagement 
provision of the Lanham Act should not be analyzed under an exceptional 
free-speech framework, such as the framework for commercial speech or 
for government subsidies, which are more tolerant of content-based re-
strictions.14 The majority’s refusal to employ an exceptional framework to 
the bar on disparaging marks raises an indefensible implication in trade-
mark law. Specifically, refusing to apply an exceptional framework to the 
anti-disparagement criterion implies that none of the other content-based 
criteria for trademark registration—such as the criterion of distinctive-
ness—should be analyzed under an exceptional framework.15 Moreover, it 
implies that the content-based restriction that trademark law imposes on 
potential infringers cannot be analyzed under an exceptional framework.16 
And in the absence of an exceptional framework, these content-based provi-
sions of the Lanham Act would be unconstitutional.17 In short, the implica-
                                                                                                                           
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” (citations omit-
ted)). 
 10 See infra notes 34–163 and accompanying text. 
 11 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), (e) (2012); infra notes 135–163 and accompanying text. 
 12 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b); infra notes 206–215 and accompanying text. 
 13 Professor Rebecca Tushnet has written on this topic as well. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 
*1–2. She also argues that the Tam decision presents difficulties in “distinguishing other aspects 
of trademark law” for First Amendment purposes. Id. at *3. 
 14 See infra notes 46–58 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 49–58 and accompanying text.  
 16 See infra notes 61–132 and accompanying text.  
 17 See infra notes 61–132 and accompanying text. 
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tion of the majority’s first premise would eliminate trademark law altogeth-
er. 
The majority’s second premise is that the anti-disparagement criterion 
does not support the purpose of trademark law.18 The majority relied on a 
faulty assumption to derive this premise—namely, that the purposes of 
trademark law are limited to preventing consumer confusion and protecting 
goodwill of a markholder.19 Courts and scholars agree that these are not the 
only purposes of trademark law.20 Indeed, preventing consumer confusion 
and protecting markholder goodwill support broader purposes, such as pro-
moting efficiency in, and proliferation of, the commercial marketplace.21 
The anti-disparagement criterion supports these broader purposes.22 The 
majority’s second premise therefore falters. 
The third premise is that the anti-disparagement criterion is viewpoint 
discriminatory.23 The majority reasoned that because the Lanham Act denies 
protection for views that disparage, but the Act grants protection for views 
that praise, the Act must be discriminatory.24 This reasoning, however, calls 
into question other content-based criteria for trademark protection.25 Specifi-
cally, the majority’s reasoning implies that the criterion of non-deceptiveness 
and the criterion of secondary meaning are viewpoint discriminatory.26 
Hence, the implication of the third premise contravenes well-established 
trademark law. 
The fourth premise is that the uncertainty in applying the anti-
disparagement criterion suggests its unconstitutionality.27 This conclusion 
ignores other well-established criteria for trademark protection that yield 
just as much uncertainty.28 Trademark is fraught with vague standards that 
guide content-based analyses in order to determine markholder rights.29 The 
anti-disparagement criterion is no different. If that criterion is unconstitu-
tional for reasons of uncertainty, so is the rest of trademark law. 
This Article concludes that the doctrinal underpinnings of the majority 
opinion are untenable and that the context of trademark implies the consti-
                                                                                                                           
 18 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1354. 
 19 See id. 
 20 See infra notes 164–216 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 164–216 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 164–216 and accompanying text. 
 23 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1336–37. 
 24 See id. 
 25 See infra notes 217–262 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 217–262 and accompanying text. 
 27 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1341–42. 
 28 See infra notes 264–299 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 264–299 and accompanying text. 
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tutionality of the anti-disparagement criterion. Part I challenges the majori-
ty’s premise that the anti-disparagement criterion should not be analyzed 
under an exceptional free-speech framework.30 Part II argues that the anti-
disparagement criterion supports the purpose of trademark law.31 Part III 
disagrees with the majority’s premise that the anti-disparagement criterion 
is viewpoint discriminatory.32 Part IV addresses the uncertainty surrounding 
the application of the anti-disparagement criterion.33 
I. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Perhaps the most important issue in deciding speech cases is the issue 
of framework. Absent an exceptional framework for evaluating restrictions, 
the Supreme Court has made clear that government “has no power to re-
strict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content.”34 Laws that target the content of speech are subject to a presump-
tive framework of strict scrutiny. The strict-scrutiny framework imposes a 
high standard for justifying a content-based restriction: the restriction must 
be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.35 A compel-
ling government interest represents an interest “of the highest order,”36 such 
as “protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors”37 or 
protecting national security.38 
The strict-scrutiny framework of analysis is not without exception. The 
Supreme Court has designated that certain situations and certain classes of 
content fall outside the strict-scrutiny standard of review.39 For instance, 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See infra notes 34–163 and accompanying text.  
 31 See infra notes 164–216 and accompanying text.  
 32 See infra notes 217–262 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 263–299 and accompanying text. 
 34 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (quoting Police Dep’t of Chi. v. 
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)); see Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011); 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” (quoting United States v. Eichman, 496 
U.S. 310, 319 (1990))).  
 35 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226. 
 36 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
 37 See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“We have recognized 
that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of mi-
nors.”). 
 38 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (“It is obvious and unarguable that no gov-
ernmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.” (quotation omitted)). 
 39 Brown, 564 U.S. at 791 (“From 1791 to the present, the First Amendment has permitted 
restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, and has never included a freedom to 
disregard these traditional limitations.” (quoting United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 
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where the government is speaking or where the restriction targets content of 
a commercial nature, courts evaluate the content-based restrictions through 
an exceptional framework that is less protective of speech.40 Exceptional 
frameworks allow government significantly more discretion in restricting 
speech content.41 
The issue in the trademark context is whether the anti-disparagement 
criterion should be evaluated under the presumptive framework of strict 
scrutiny or, alternatively, under an exceptional free-speech framework. It is 
arguable that the anti-disparagement criterion should be analyzed under any 
of three exceptional frameworks: (1) the government-subsidy framework;42 
(2) the commercial-speech framework;43 and (3) the limited-public-forum 
framework.44 Any of these frameworks could allow government to exercise 
subject-matter content discrimination in regulating trademark registration, 
depending on how the regulation relates to the purpose of trademark law.45 
                                                                                                                           
(2010))). Nevertheless, some speech falls outside the general rule prohibiting government discrim-
ination based on content. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) (upholding government regulation of commercial speech); 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (prohibiting inciteful speech); Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (allowing regulation of obscene speech); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (allowing local governments to curtail “fighting words”). In 
addition, certain circumstances warrant limited government regulation of some speech content. 
See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015) (hold-
ing that government speech may be limited based on content in certain circumstances); Nat’l En-
dowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–88 (1998) (holding that the government may 
choose not to subsidize some speech with discretionary spending); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visi-
tors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (holding that the government may regulate speech 
made in a limited public forum of the government’s own creation). 
 40 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245 (government speech); Finley, 524 U.S. at 587–88 (govern-
ment subsidies); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (limited public forum); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 
562–63 (commercial speech exception); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–49 (incitement exception); 
Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (obscenity exception); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (fighting words excep-
tion). 
 41 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245 (government speech); Finley, 524 U.S. at 587–88 (govern-
ment subsidies); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (limited public forum); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 
562–63 (commercial speech exception); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–49 (incitement exception); 
Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (obscenity exception); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (fighting words excep-
tion). 
 42 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1368–71 (Dyk, J., concurring) (analyzing trademark as a subsi-
dy that allows for content-based restrictions and concluding “[t]hat trademark registration is a 
subsidy is not open to doubt”). 
 43 See id. at 1376–78 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (analyzing anti-disparagement criterion under 
commercial-speech framework). 
 44 Cf. Ned Snow, Content-Based Copyright Denial, 90 IND. L.J. 1473, 1486–89 (2015) (ex-
plaining application of limited-public forum doctrine for content of intellectual property in context 
of copyright law). 
 45 In Tam, the Government also argued for another exceptional free-speech framework—the 
framework for government speaker. See 808 F.3d at 1339. That framework within the exceptional 
frameworks mentioned above is not included here because the majority’s dismissal of that frame-
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This Part, however, does not examine the intricacies of these frameworks and 
their arguable application to the trademark context. Judge Dyk’s concurrence 
and Judge Reyna’s dissent in Tam already provide much of that analysis.46 
Instead, this Part provides only a brief explanation of how these exceptional 
frameworks might apply in evaluating content-based restrictions in trademark 
law.47 After that brief analysis, this Part examines whether other areas of 
trademark law suggest that some sort of exceptional framework must govern 
the analysis of the anti-disparagement criterion.48 
A. Exceptional Frameworks in Speech Law 
The first exceptional free-speech framework that arguably should gov-
ern the analysis of the anti-disparagement criterion is the government-subsidy 
framework. Courts apply this framework when evaluating content-based re-
strictions that accompany government subsidies.49 For instance, this frame-
work applies where government adopts content-based standards as a criterion 
for funding artistic works.50 Arguably, trademark rights constitute a subsidy 
that Congress provides to private speakers.51 The anti-disparagement criterion 
is a content-based condition for receiving the benefits of trademark registra-
tion, so this framework seems potentially applicable. 
The second framework occurs where speech content is of a commer-
cial nature.52 For instance, this framework applies in evaluating whether a 
state can restrict deceptive advertising.53 Arguably, trademarks constitute 
                                                                                                                           
work appears correct. See id. at 1345–48. Nevertheless, Professor Tushnet provides a plausible 
argument for the government-speaker framework under the rationale of the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Walker. 135 S. Ct. at 2239; see Tushnet, supra note 1, at *7–11. 
 46 See 808 F.3d at 1368–71 (Dyk, J., concurring and dissenting) (suggesting that both the 
commercial speech and government subsidy frameworks may apply); id. at 1376–82 (Reyna, J., 
dissenting) (concluding that trademarks are quintessential commercial speech). 
 47 See infra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 61–163 and accompanying text. 
 49 See Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 188–89 (2007) (“[I]t is well estab-
lished that the government can make content-based distinctions when it subsidizes speech.”); 
Finley, 524 U.S. at 588 (“Congress may selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities 
it believes to be in the public interest . . . .” (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991))). 
 50 See, e.g., Finley, 524 U.S. at 572, 587–88. 
 51 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1368–71 (Dyk, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 52 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63 (“[O]ur decisions have recognized ‘the “commonsense” 
distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area tradition-
ally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech.’ The Constitution therefore 
accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expres-
sion.” (citations omitted) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978))). 
 53 See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977). 
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commercial speech because they indicate the source of the good for sale.54 
By indicating the source of a good, trademarks aid consumers in making 
their purchasing decisions. Hence, the commercial-speech framework argu-
ably should govern a speech analysis of the anti-disparagement criterion. 
The third framework is the limited-public forum. Courts apply this 
framework when evaluating restrictions on speech that occur within a forum 
that the government has created for limited purposes.55 For instance, this 
framework applies where government funds a student organization or a 
publication; the organization or the publications are considered a metaphys-
ical forum.56 Arguably, the trademark system functions as a metaphysical 
forum that Congress created for limited commercial purposes.57 Congress 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1376–82 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (“Trademarks are commercial 
speech.”); see also Victor Brundley, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. 
Rev. 1153, 1155–56 (2012) (explaining that commercial speech includes speech that “does no 
more than . . . simply identify the putative seller’s products”). For the sake of brevity, throughout 
the Article, the “goods” that are referenced represent both goods and services. See 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1052, 1053 (2012) (providing protection to both goods and services). 
 55 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (“The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and 
legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups 
or for the discussion of certain topics.”). 
 56 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679–80 (2010) (student organization); 
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–31 (recognizing university funding for student publications as “a 
forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense”). 
 57 In Christian Legal Society, a student organization, the Christian Legal Society (“CLS”) 
sought to exclude students from its organization based on homosexual conduct or religious beliefs. 
561 U.S. at 672. Because of these exclusions, Hastings Law School refused to give CLS official 
recognition as a student organization, which made CLS ineligible for a variety of privileges (e.g., 
funding and facility use). Id. at 672–73. At issue, then, was whether the First Amendment preclud-
ed Hastings from denying the benefit of official recognition as a student organization. Id. at 678–
80. In deciding this question, the Court applied a limited-public-forum analysis. Id. One reason for 
the Court’s application of limited-public forum was that the benefit was a subsidy rather than a 
prohibition. Id. at 682. In the Court’s words: 
[T]his case fits comfortably within the limited-public-forum category, for CLS, in 
seeking what is effectively a state subsidy, faces only indirect pressure to modify its 
membership policies; CLS may exclude any person for any reason if it forgoes the 
benefits of official recognition. . . . In diverse contexts, our decisions have distin-
guished between policies that require action and those that withhold benefits. Appli-
cation of the less restrictive limited-public-forum analysis better accounts for the 
fact that Hastings, through its [student organization] program, is dangling the carrot 
of subsidy, not wielding the stick of prohibition. 
Id. at 682–83 (citations and quotations omitted). Because CLS could still exist as an organization, 
even if it did not comply with the law school’s condition, the pressure to comply with the condi-
tion was indirect. See id. Denying the benefit was less severe than compelling compliance, and for 
that reason, the less restrictive analysis of limited-public forum was appropriate. See id. 
 Analogously, even if a markholder is denied registration, the markholder can still use a dis-
paraging mark as a trademark; the markholder simply cannot receive the rights that derive from 
registration. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1374–75 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (observing that even if a 
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creates the metaphysical forum of property rights for markholders to bring 
about marketplace efficiency and to promote the collective wellbeing of the 
marketplace.58 Hence, the limited-public-forum framework is also arguable. 
Having provided a brief description of three exceptional free-speech 
frameworks that are potentially applicable to the disparagement criterion, 
this Part contends that other areas of trademark law also imply that the anti-
disparagement criterion should be analyzed under one of these frameworks. 
In making this argument, Section B observes that the reasoning of the majori-
ty implies inconsistent frameworks for evaluating similar trademark provi-
sions.59 Section C argues that, in contravention to the majority’s analysis, 
established trademark doctrines imply that the framework should not em-
ploy strict scrutiny.60 
B. Inconsistent Frameworks for Similar Trademark Provisions 
The majority in Tam concluded that the anti-disparagement criterion 
should not be evaluated under any of the three exceptional free-speech 
frameworks.61 It reached this conclusion based on the premise that the 
source-identification function of a mark is distinct from an expressive ele-
ment of a mark.62 With respect to the source-identification function of a 
mark, the majority recognized that a mark serves to identify the source of a 
good, indicating who is producing and selling the good.63 That ability to 
serve as a source identifier, the majority explained, is not an expressive el-
ement of a mark; nevertheless, a mark may contain an expressive element, 
such as a disparaging opinion.64 In the majority’s words: 
                                                                                                                           
markholder cannot register a mark, “[t]he markholder may still generally use the mark as it wish-
es; without federal registration, it simply lacks access to certain federal statutory enforcement 
mechanisms for excluding others from confusingly similar uses of the mark”). 
 58 See infra notes 164–216 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of trademark 
law). 
 59 See infra notes 61–132 and accompanying text. 
 60 See infra notes 135–163 and accompanying text. 
 61 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1338 (rejecting commercial-speech framework by noting that “[t]he 
disparagement provision must be assessed under First Amendment standards applicable to what it 
targets, which is not the commercial-speech function of the mark”); id. at 1351–53 (rejecting gov-
ernment-subsidy framework reasoning that “[t]rademark registration is not a subsidy”); id. at 1353 
n.12 (dismissing public-forum analysis). 
 62 Id. at 1338. 
 63 Id. (“[T]rademarks identify the source of a product or service, and therefore play a role in 
the ‘dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what rea-
son, and at what price.’” (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976))). 
 64 Id. (“This case exemplifies how marks often have an expressive aspect over and above their 
commercial-speech aspect.”). 
1648 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1639 
[C]ritically, it is always a mark’s expressive character, not its abil-
ity to serve as a source identifier, that is the basis for the dispar-
agement exclusion from registration. The disparagement provi-
sion must be assessed under First Amendment standards applica-
ble to what it targets, which is not the commercial-speech func-
tion of the mark.65 
The majority thereby drew a distinction between the element of a mark that 
serves as a source identifier and the element of a mark that has expressive 
character (i.e., a disparaging opinion).66 
This distinction between source identification and expression is the 
linchpin of the majority’s analysis. The majority reasoned that because any 
expressive element in a mark is distinct from the mark’s source-identification 
element, an expressive element does not concern the commercial purpose of 
the mark, and thereby, an expressive element requires greater speech protec-
tion than does the source-identification element.67 Stated differently, the 
majority believed that a speech restriction that targets the expressive ele-
ment of a mark must be analyzed under the normal free-speech framework, 
in contrast to a speech restriction that targets the source-identification ele-
ment of a mark, which would be analyzed under an exceptional frame-
work.68 Therefore, because the anti-disparagement criterion targets an ex-
pressive element of a mark—i.e., a disparaging opinion—the majority held 
that the criterion should not be analyzed under any of the exceptional 
frameworks.69 
1. Source Identification as an Expressive Element 
The majority appears correct that there are two elements in a disparag-
ing mark: the source-identification element and the disparagement element. 
Yet the majority erroneously assumed that only the disparagement element 
is expressive. That assumption is entirely incorrect. Source identification is 
just as expressive as disparagement, if not more so. For purposes of free 
speech, source identification is self-identification, and self-identification is 
highly expressive.70 That is to say, a trademark represents the means 
through which the producer or seller of a good chooses to identify itself as 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See id. 
 68 See id. 
 69 See id. at 1339. 
 70 See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 559, 
572–73 (1995) (striking down application of statute that would have required a parade organized 
by private citizens to include a message that the private organizers did not want to convey). 
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the source of the good.71 For instance, J. Willard Marriott has chosen to 
identify his sponsorship of the hotel chain by using his last name.72 He is 
communicating that the same quality and reputation that consumers may 
know to be true about him is also true for the business of which he is the 
source. He is expressing the identity and source of the hotel chain by ex-
pressing the meaning and significance of his own name. It thus seems in-
disputable that expressing an identity includes an expressive element. In-
deed, as a practical matter, who is speaking can be just as important as what 
is being said. Source identification is an expressive element of a mark. 
Not only does the source-identification function of a mark represent an 
expressive element of a mark, it represents an expressive element with great 
value as speech. Self-identification is necessary for determining one’s own 
identity.73 At its core, identifying oneself is part of the process for defining 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof—(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide 
intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this 
chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manu-
factured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is un-
known.”); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 3:6 (4th ed., 2016) (“Trademarks answer the question: ‘who are you?’”). 
 72 See MARRIOTT, Registration No. 0899900. 
 73 An example of the constitutional theme of protecting a person’s ability to choose its identi-
ty is apparent in NAACP v. Alabama, in which the State of Alabama had attempted to subpoena 
membership records of the NAACP after the State alleged that the NAACP had not met statutory 
requirements for doing business in the state. 357 U.S. 449, 451–52 (1958). The Court considered 
the effects of requiring the NAACP to turn over its membership lists: 
[W]e think it apparent that compelled disclosure of [the NAACP]’s Alabama mem-
bership is likely to affect adversely the ability of [the NAACP] and its members to 
pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to 
advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw from [the NAACP] and dis-
suade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown 
through their associations and of the consequences of this exposure. 
Id. at 462–63. The State was threatening the NAACP in a way that would interfere with member-
ship in the NAACP, such that it would be unable to determine its identity. See id. 
 The theme of being able to determine one’s own identity is also apparent in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, in which the Court considered a Connecticut law that prohibited means for preventing 
contraception. 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). In striking down the law, the Court suggested a theme of 
protecting an individual’s right to make choices for oneself, which define who the individual is: 
The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of 
Rights. The right to educate a child in a school of the parents’ choice—whether pub-
lic or private or parochial—is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to study any par-
ticular subject or any foreign language. Yet the First Amendment has been construed 
to include certain of those rights. 
Id.; see also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (“This Court has long rec-
ognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liber-
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oneself. And the constitutional importance of self-identity cannot be doubt-
ed.74 So, although expression of identification does represent an important 
commercial function in trademark law, that same expression also represents 
an important constitutional value.75 It is valuable speech. Hence, to recog-
nize only the commercial value of source identification is to ignore the 
speech value of self-identification. 
This conclusion—that source identification contains an expressive el-
ement of a mark—is so simple and obvious that it can be easy to miss. 
Judge Dyk’s concurrence is illustrative: although he criticized most of the 
majority’s application of speech law, he ultimately concurred with the ma-
jority’s judgment on the grounds that the mark at issue constituted core-
protected speech.76 The mark at issue was THE SLANTS, which its propo-
nent, Mr. Tam, chose as a name for his rock band.77 Mr. Tam explained the 
reason that his rock band chose THE SLANTS as follows: “We want to take 
on these stereotypes that people have about us, like the slanted eyes, and 
own them. We’re very proud of being Asian—we’re not going to hide that 
fact.”78 This reason led Judge Dyk to characterize the mark as having “in-
disputably expressive character,” and that expressive character led Judge 
Dyk to believe that the government could not withhold trademark protec-
tion.79 Tellingly, the expressive character of THE SLANTS that Judge Dyk 
found so compelling did not derive from its disparaging opinion.80 Rather, 
the expressive character on which Judge Dyk relied derived from Mr. Tam’s 
choice of how to identify his group: THE SLANTS conveys a deep social 
meaning of Mr. Tam’s pride in being Asian, to the point that he calls his 
band a racial slur to challenge the negative connotation.81 Hence, Mr. Tam 
is not using THE SLANTS as an attempt to disparage Asians (even though 
the mark is disparaging to them); rather, Mr. Tam is using THE SLANTS to 
express an opinion about his own identity as the source of the band.82 Mr. 
                                                                                                                           
ties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (quoting Cleveland Bd. 
of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974))). 
 74 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty presumes an autonomy of self 
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 75 See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
 76 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1373–75 (Dyk, J., concurring) (quoting In re Simon Shiao Tam, 108 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1305, 2013 WL 5498164 (T.T.A.B. 2013)). 
 77 Id. at 1327–28 (majority opinion). 
 78 Id. at 1373 (Dyk, J., concurring). 
 79 Id. 
 80 See id. 
 81 See id. 
 82 See id. 
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Tam uses THE SLANTS to express source identification—a choice of how 
to identify oneself as the source of a good. 
The REDSKINS mark further exemplifies the principle that the 
source-identification element of a mark is highly expressive. The owner of 
the Redskins organization, Daniel Snyder, does not intend to disparage Na-
tive Americans by using REDSKINS as a mark—even if Native Americans 
perceive the mark to be disparaging.83 Instead, Snyder is attempting to 
compare his team to warriors who were Native Americans.84 For Snyder, 
REDSKINS captures this meaning. He expresses REDSKINS to convey 
this meaning as the source of the team.85 When consumers refer to his team, 
he wants them to think of the team that is like Native American warriors as 
the identification of the source.86 Source identification is thus a highly ex-
pressive element of the REDSKINS mark. 
Despite these examples, one might still argue that any expressiveness 
in a mark is distinct from its source-identification function. The argument 
would be that any meaning expressed through the mark is in addition to, 
and thereby distinct from, the mark’s function as a referent for the mar-
kholder. The meaning that a mark may express seems separate from its abil-
ity to distinguish itself from other brands, so arguably the function of dis-
tinguishing oneself from others is non-expressive. This argument suggests 
that the Tam majority was correct to treat the source-identification element 
of a mark separately from the expressive element. 
An example illustrates this counterargument. Consider the marks KO-
DAK for cameras and JUST DO IT for shoes.87 The KODAK mark is a 
made-up, fanciful word that provides a basis for consumers to distinguish 
the Eastman Kodak Company from other camera manufacturers.88 It would 
thereby seem that KODAK could just as easily be a random number to ena-
ble consumers to distinguish it. KODAK does not seem to have meaning; it 
seemingly serves only to refer consumers to the source of the camera. By 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See Daniel Snyder, Letter from Washington Redskins Owner Dan Snyder to Fans, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/letterfrom-washington-redskins-owner-
dan-snyder-to-fans/2013/10/09/e7670ba0-30fe-11e3-8627-c5d7de0a046b_story.html [https://perma.
cc/786Z-TPPM]. 
 84 Id. (“Washington Redskins is more than a name we have called our football team for over 
eight decades. It is a symbol of everything we stand for: strength, courage, pride, and respect—the 
same values we know guide Native Americans and which are embedded throughout their rich 
history as the original Americans.”). 
 85 See id. 
 86 See id. 
 87 See KODAK, Registration No. 0389813; JUST DO IT, Registration No. 1875307. 
 88 See Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Laredo, Tex. v. Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Austin, Tex., 909 
F.2d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Fanciful terms are most often coined words such as ‘Xerox’ or 
‘Kodak.’”). 
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contrast, the JUST DO IT mark expresses the message of accomplishing a 
task immediately, while at the same time referring consumers to the source 
of the good, which is Nike, Inc. The meaning of accomplishing a task im-
mediately in JUST DO IT seems distinct from the function of identifying 
source. It thus seems possible to separate out any expressive meaning in a 
mark from the source-identification function of a mark. Whereas JUST DO 
IT has such expressive meaning, KODAK does not. This example, then, 
might be used to argue that if expression is present in a mark, the expression 
is distinguishable from its source-identification function. 
This counterargument fails to recognize the meaning that is inherent in 
the source-identification function of every mark. In identifying the source 
of a good, a mark does more than merely refer consumers to that source. 
The mark expresses the way that the markholder desires for consumers to 
conceive of the source.89 Consider KODAK. In addition to referring con-
sumers to the camera manufacturer, KODAK provides a particular combi-
nation of letters as an expression for conceiving the identity of that manu-
facturer. The KODAK mark enables consumers to conceive of the source in 
a distinct way.90 Would consumers think of the camera manufacturer in the 
same way if the mark were 400075HQU345YX instead of KODAK? The 
former is long and difficult to articulate; the latter is short, incisive, and 
easy to say. Although both marks could serve to refer consumers to the 
                                                                                                                           
 89 According to the philosopher Gottlob Frege, a name has both a sense and a reference. See 
Gottlob Frege, On Sense and Meaning (1892), reprinted in COLLECTED PAPERS ON MATHEMAT-
ICS, LOGIC, AND PHILOSOPHY 157, 160 (Brian McGuinness ed., Max Black trans., 1984). The 
reference of a name is the actual person to which the name refers. See id. The sense of a name is 
the way in which that name enables someone to conceive of the person. See id. Consider the 
statements: (1) John believes that Samuel Clemens wrote a book; and (2) Jill believes that Mark 
Twain wrote the same book. From these statements, is it true that Jill believes that Samuel Clem-
ens wrote the book? Clearly not. Jill believes that the same person wrote the book that John be-
lieves wrote the book, but that is not the same as saying that Jill believes Samuel Clemens wrote 
the book. See GOTTLOB FREGE, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta 
ed., 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege/ [https://perma.cc/PMT6-ABS6] (reciting similar 
example). Although Samuel Clemens and Mark Twain refer to the same person (that is, they have 
the same reference), the two different names communicate distinct senses. The distinct senses 
between Samuel Clemens and Mark Twain communicate different ways for a person to think of 
the same person. Hence, a name carries a distinct sense, a means for conceiving of the object to 
which it refers. The same is true for trademarks. See Tom W. Bell, Virtual Trade Dress: A Very 
Real Problem, 56 MD. L. REV. 384, 412 n.164 (1997) (applying Frege’s sense and reference di-
chotomy to trademark law). The trademark has both a reference, which is the source of the good to 
which the mark refers, and a sense, which is the way in which the mark enables the consumer to 
conceive of the source. Cf. Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. 
REV. 621, 648–49 (2004) (“The trademark, then, is not an irreducible, indivisible thing, but rather 
a set of relations, specifically, of semiotic relations of reference. It is more wave than particle. Its 
relational nature creates a host of conceptual problems . . . .”). 
 90 See Frege, supra note 89, at 159–61. 
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camera manufacturer, the KODAK mark is better able to communicate a 
means for consumers to conceive of and express the manufacturer. Thus, 
KODAK represents the camera manufacturer’s expressive choice for how 
consumers should conceive of the source of particular cameras. There is 
expression inherent in the source-identification role of a trademark, inde-
pendent of the referent function.91  
Thus, every mark—even marks that have no meaning independent of 
the mark—represents an expressive choice for how consumers should con-
ceive of the source.92 A mark does more than merely refer a consumer to a 
particular source; it communicates a way to conceive of the source.93 That 
communication constitutes expression within the source-identification ele-
ment of a mark. 
In addition to communicating a way to conceive of the source, the 
source-identification element of a mark often serves to communicate mean-
ing about the source. One such meaning is brand quality. Markholders may 
communicate brand quality as part of their identity.94 Simply put, consum-
ers associate quality (or lack thereof) with a mark.95 Contrast the differences 
in quality that consumers might associate between KIA and LAMBOR-
GHINI for automobiles, WALMART and SONY for electronics, or K-
                                                                                                                           
 91 KODAK is distinct from any other symbol, and its creator, George Eastman, chose it to 
communicate to consumers how to think of the camera manufacturer. To illustrate: Would con-
sumers think of the camera manufacturer in the same way if its mark were AX£U135988 instead 
of KODAK? No. Although either KODAK or AX£U135988 could serve as a reference for the 
source of the cameras, Eastman chose a mark that allows consumers a straightforward method of 
conceiving of the camera’s source. Indeed, the KODAK mark in particular demonstrates the ex-
pressive choice of its creator; Eastman specifically sought a mark that was short, that started and 
ended with the letter K (because K was a “strong incisive sort of letter”), and that was incapable of 
being misspelled “to an extent that [would] destroy its identity.” Eastman stated his reasoning for 
using this fanciful word that he invented as his mark: 
A trademark should be short [and] vigorous . . . incapable of being misspelled to an 
extent that will destroy its identity . . . . [I]t must mean nothing . . . . The letter “K” 
had been a favorite with me—it seemed a strong incisive sort of letter. Therefore, 
the word I wanted had to start with “K.” Then it became a question of trying out a 
great number of combinations of letters that made words starting and ending with 
“K.” The word “Kodak” is the result . . . . It became the distinctive word for our 
products. 
The Story Behind . . . Kodak Trademark, KIPLINGER MAG., Apr. 1962, at 40. 
 92 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (recognizing that 
trademark protection extends to symbols that are “capable of carrying meaning”). 
 93 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 94 See MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 3:10 (“[T]he source theory has been broadened to in-
clude not only manufacturing source but also the source of standards of quality of goods bearing 
the mark: ‘[A] mark primarily functions to indicate a single quality control source of the goods or 
services.’” (quoting In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814 n.15 (C.C.P.A. 1978))). 
 95 See id. 
1654 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1639 
MART and TARGET for a department store. Distinct meanings that relate 
to the quality of goods and their source are inherent in these marks. Mar-
kholders communicate such meanings as part of their identity; the meanings 
develop as markholders gain a specific reputation about their quality of 
goods. Marks thereby represent expressions of identity to which meanings 
of quality (or lack thereof) may attach.96 Thus, meanings that relate to the 
quality of goods inhere in the identification of source. 
The meaning that a mark may communicate about its source is not lim-
ited to brand quality. A markholder may choose to communicate an addi-
tional meaning about the source as part of its source identification. Consider 
again the mark JUST DO IT. This mark reflects a choice to express the 
source’s identity with a meaning that is already established in language. 
JUST DO IT conveys the meaning of accomplishing a task immediately as 
part of its identification of source. Nike, Inc. adopts that meaning as part of 
its identity. Notably, the JUST DO IT mark refers to the same source as the 
NIKE mark, yet each mark communicates a different meaning about that 
same source. The JUST DO IT mark communicates a meaning of accom-
plishing a task immediately, whereas the NIKE mark communicates a 
meaning of the Greek goddess of victory.97 To the extent that consumers 
recognize those meanings when they observe the mark, those meanings be-
come part of the source’s identity. Through the respective marks, consumers 
recognize that the source is seeking to be known as those meanings. In sum, 
JUST DO IT expresses its source with the following meanings: a distinct 
way to conceive of the source; the quality of the brand; and accomplishing a 
task immediately. These meanings follow from Nike, Inc.’s choice of how 
to express itself as the source of shoes. They are part of the source-
identification function of the JUST DO IT mark. 
This is not to say, however, that a source cannot use a mark to express 
a meaning in addition to its identification. For example, the mark AN IN-
CONVENIENT TRUTH for Al Gore’s movie certainly comments on a so-
cial issue, so consumers likely perceive it to be a proposition beyond mere 
source identification. Perhaps Al Gore intends to communicate through this 
mark that people are ignoring an important truth (i.e., global warming). The 
mark clearly communicates a political message. Nevertheless, the political 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164 (“[Trademark] law helps assure a producer that it (and 
not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a 
desirable product. The law thereby encourages the production of quality products . . . . It is the 
source-distinguishing ability of a mark—not its ontological status as color, shape, fragrance, word, 
or sign—that permits it to serve these basic purposes.” (quotation omitted)). 
 97 See NIKE, Registration No. 0978952; Nike, 2 A SUPPLEMENT TO THE OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 1207 (1976) (defining Nike to mean the goddess of victory in Greek mythology). 
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meaning of AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH is also part of the identification 
of source. The political meaning serves to identify the source, just like any 
other meaning would. Hence, AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH tells consum-
ers that the source includes the political meaning, and at the same time, it 
advocates that political meaning for its own sake. So although the source-
identification element is distinct from the political element (or as it may be, 
a disparaging element), the same meaning is present in both elements. 
This conclusion that an expressive element is part of the source-
identification function of a mark is further evident in a fundamental doc-
trine of trademark law. To be eligible for trademark registration, a mark’s 
meaning must be distinct from the meaning of the good.98 Stated differently, 
for a mark to properly identify its source, the mark must convey a message 
different than the characteristics or attributes of the good.99 The word 
FRUIT, for instance, cannot serve as the mark for apples. Simply put, 
trademark law requires marks to express a message distinct from the goods 
to which they are attached.100 This fundamental doctrine implies that marks 
must communicate a message that expresses identity as distinct from a mes-
sage that is the meaning of the good itself. Thus, the requirement of distinc-
tiveness implies a requirement that a mark communicate a certain meaning 
or, in other words, that a mark be expressive. 
The upshot is that the majority’s premise that the source-identification 
element of a mark is not expressive is simply incorrect.101 The fact that the 
disparagement element contains expression does not imply that the source-
identification element does not. Source identification is entirely expressive. 
Source identification represents a choice regarding which content should rep-
resent the source. Source identification is tantamount to self-identification. 
2. Content Discrimination in the Distinctiveness Criterion 
This conclusion that the source-identification function of a mark repre-
sents an expressive element raises implications in speech law. The conclu-
sion suggests constitutional concern over content-based restrictions that 
target the source-identification function of a mark.102 That is, criteria that 
define trademark eligibility seem constitutionally suspect where the criteria 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)–(f) (2012); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 
F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976) (explaining the distinctiveness criterion for protection). 
 99 See Bell, supra note 89, at 412. 
 100 See MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 11:4. 
 101 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1338. 
 102 See, e.g., Brown, 564 U.S. at 790–91 (“[A]s a general matter, . . . government has no pow-
er to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” (quot-
ing Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 573)). 
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turn on the content of source-identifying elements in a mark.103 In the ab-
sence of an exceptional free-speech framework, any content-based criteria 
that affect a source’s ability to express its identity would seem unconstitu-
tional on their face.104 
The Lanham Act includes several content-based criteria for protection, 
including the criterion that a mark must be distinctive.105 A brief explana-
tion of the distinctiveness criterion may be helpful here: to gain trademark 
protection, a mark must have a meaning that is sufficiently distinct from the 
meaning of the good to which it is attached.106 For instance, the word AP-
PLE cannot serve as a trademark for selling apples because the meaning of 
APPLE is not distinct from the meaning of the good (apples).107 On the oth-
er hand, APPLE can serve as a mark for computers because in that context, 
the meaning of APPLE is distinct from the meaning of the good (comput-
ers).108 Furthermore, marks that merely describe a good are not sufficiently 
distinct to be eligible for trademark registration, unless a markholder can 
show that consumers understand the descriptive mark to be indicating 
source as opposed to describing the good. This understanding is called sec-
ondary meaning.109 In many instances, secondary meaning can be difficult 
                                                                                                                           
 103 See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 118 (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying 
the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” (quoting Eichman, 496 U.S. at 
319)). 
 104 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (“Government regulation of speech is content based if a law 
applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. This 
commonsense meaning of the phrase ‘content based’ requires a court to consider whether a regula-
tion of speech ‘on its face’ draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.” (citations 
omitted)); Brown, 564 U.S. at 790 (noting limited exceptions to prohibition of content discrimina-
tion). 
 105 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012) (stating criteria for trademark registration). 
 106 See id. § 1052(e)–(f); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UN-
FAIR COMPETITION § 11:2. (4th ed. 2016).  
 107 The apple mark for selling apples is an example of a generic term that can never receive 
trademark protection. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9 (explaining classification of generic marks). 
 108 See Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1117 
(6th Cir. 1996) (describing Apple computer as an example of an arbitrary mark that receives strong 
trademark protection). 
 109 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (allowing for registration of a mark that has become distinctive 
through use in commerce); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) 
(“[A] mark has acquired distinctiveness, even if it is not inherently distinctive, if it has developed 
secondary meaning, which occurs when, in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a 
mark is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.” (quotations omitted)); 
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9–10 (explaining the requirement of secondary meaning for descriptive 
marks). 
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to show.110 The relevant point, though, is that to determine the distinctive-
ness of a mark, and thereby its eligibility for trademark protection, the PTO 
must examine a mark’s content as that content relates to the particular good 
to which it is attached. The criterion of distinctiveness thereby directly af-
fects the source-identifying function of a mark, which as discussed above, 
constitutes an expressive element of a mark. 
Consider a simple example that illustrates the content-based discrimi-
nation that the distinctiveness criterion imposes on the self-identification 
element of speech. In In re Major League Umpires, three major league um-
pires chose the term MAJOR LEAGUE UMPIRE as a mark for sports 
clothing and equipment.111 The PTO denied trademark registration for the 
mark on the grounds that it lacked distinctiveness: the mark described who 
the providers of the goods were, which was held to be descriptive of the 
good, insufficiently distinct for trademark registration.112 Hence, the um-
pires’ choice to express their occupation as an identification of source re-
sulted in their ineligibility for the benefits of trademark registration.113 To 
gain those benefits, the umpires needed to identify themselves differently. 
The case thus illustrates that the distinctiveness criterion enables govern-
ment to influence the content of the expressive element of source identifica-
tion.114 
Another mark that illustrates the content-based restriction of the dis-
tinctiveness criterion is THE SLANTS.115 Recall that Mr. Tam chose THE 
SLANTS as the mark for his rock band in order to describe the fact that its 
members were of Asian heritage.116 The mark arguably describes the rock 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992) (recognizing the diffi-
culty of establishing secondary meaning for a small business starting a new product in a limited 
area). 
 111 See In re Major League Umpires, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1059, 2001 WL 777067 (T.T.A.B. 2001). 
 112 Id. at 1061. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board noted in its decision that the umpires 
had procedurally waived any claim to secondary meaning. See id. 
 113 See id. at 1062. 
 114 Interestingly, the Lanham Act denies trademark protection to surnames even where, as in 
most instances, there is no relationship between the meaning of a surname and the good. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1052(e) (denying protection for marks that are “primarily merely a surname”). For in-
stance, the meaning of Ford has nothing to do with automobiles, except as an indicator of source. 
Therefore, the justification for the content-based exclusion of surnames cannot be to promote 
consumer recognition of source. See Peaceable Planet, Inc. v. Ty, Inc., 362 F.3d 986, 988–89 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (recognizing that the reason for not extending protection to surnames is not because of 
problems with distinctiveness). 
 115 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1373 (Dyk, J., concurring) (considering reason for trademark 
applicant’s use of the term The Slants). 
 116 See id. (quoting Mr. Tam as saying, “We want to take on these stereotypes that people 
have about us, like the slanted eyes, and own them. We’re very proud of being Asian—we’re not 
going to hide that fact”). 
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band in the same way that MAJOR LEAGUE UMPIRE described the 
sellers of the sports clothing and equipment discussed in the paragraph 
above.117 It would seem, then, that the PTO could possibly have denied 
trademark registration to Mr. Tam on the grounds that THE SLANTS lacks 
distinctiveness, independent of its apparent disparaging opinion.118 In that 
hypothetical scenario, the distinctiveness criterion would target Mr. Tam’s 
expressive choice to identify his band as THE SLANTS.119 The PTO would 
have denied him his expressive choice to use a mark that indicated his 
Asian heritage as his identification of source. 
Of course, that scenario is only hypothetical, but it illustrates an im-
portant point. If the PTO had denied trademark registration on the grounds 
that THE SLANTS lacks distinctiveness (rather than on disparagement 
grounds), would Mr. Tam nevertheless be entitled to trademark registration 
because, in the words of Judge Dyk, THE SLANTS has an “indisputably 
expressive character”?120 Would the First Amendment compel trademark 
registration because the source-identifying element is highly expressive? 
Clearly not.121 Otherwise the distinctiveness criterion would be unconstitu-
tional, which simply cannot be true. The distinctiveness criterion is so well 
established and engrained in American jurisprudence that its constitutionali-
ty appears indisputable.122 Indeed, without the distinctiveness criterion, 
consumers would face difficulties in recognizing brands, and markholders 
could monopolize crucial words for an industry.123 Without the content-based 
criterion of distinctiveness, trademark law would lead to great inefficiencies 
in the commercial marketplace.124 It is thus axiomatic that the requirement 
                                                                                                                           
 117 Compare id. (describing that THE SLANTS was a mere descriptor for the band members), 
with In re Major League Umpires, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1060–62 (noting that MAJOR LEAGUE 
UMPIRE describes the provider of the goods or services and is also merely descriptive of those 
goods and services). 
 118 This possibility is based on the assumption that Mr. Tam could not have shown secondary 
meaning. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)–(f) (2012). 
 119 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1373 (Dyk, J., concurring) (“Mr. Tam’s choice of mark reflects 
a clear desire to editorialize on cultural and political subjects. Mr. Tam chose THE SLANTS at 
least in part to reclaim the negative racial stereotype it embodies . . . .”). 
 120 See id. 
 121 In addition to calling into question the distinctiveness criterion, the majority’s reasoning 
calls into question a well-established provision of the Lanham Act that precludes registration of 
government symbols. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b). This government-symbol criterion represents an 
ostensible content-based criterion that targets core protected speech. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 417–20 (1989) (recognizing destruction of the flag as protected political speech). 
 122 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 211 (recognizing distinctiveness requirement); 
Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 162 (same); Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 769 (same). 
 123 See MCCARTHY, supra note 106, § 12:2 
 124 See id. 
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for distinctiveness is constitutional. A refusal to register THE SLANTS 
based on failure of distinctiveness could not violate the First Amendment. 
The only way, though, that the distinctiveness criterion could be con-
stitutional is if it is analyzed under one of the exceptional free-speech 
frameworks discussed above.125 That is, only if trademark registration were 
evaluated within the framework of commercial speech, government subsidy, 
or limited-public forum could the content-based restriction requiring dis-
tinctiveness be constitutional.126 Because the distinctiveness criterion must 
be constitutional, one of these frameworks must apply. The fact that the dis-
tinctiveness criterion targets an expressive element of a mark (source identi-
fication) cannot preclude its analysis under one of these exceptional frame-
works. The distinctiveness criterion targets the expressive element of source 
identification, yet that criterion must still be analyzed under one of the ex-
ceptional frameworks.127 
This conclusion is relevant to the anti-disparagement criterion. Recall 
that the majority refused to analyze the anti-disparagement criterion under 
any of the exceptional frameworks for the reason that the criterion targeted an 
expressive element of a mark (i.e., disparagement).128 That reason is incon-
                                                                                                                           
 125 See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (reciting high standard of strict scrutiny). 
One might argue that an exceptional framework is not necessary to find the distinctiveness criteri-
on constitutional because that criterion could satisfy the demanding standards of strict scrutiny. 
This argument is not likely to succeed. As stated above, strict scrutiny requires that the content-
based restriction be narrowly tailored in order to serve a compelling government interest. See 
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226. Here, the government interest underlying the distinctiveness criterion 
does not seem compelling. The interest is to promote marketplace efficiency. See supra notes 
122–124 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of trademark law with respect to a mark’s 
function of distinguishing between goods). Perhaps on its face, efficiency in the marketplace does 
seem important. Yet the efficiency that results from the distinctiveness criterion appears only 
marginally greater, if at all greater, than the efficiency that results from the common-law torts of 
passing off or unfair competition. In other words, market efficiency that follows from consumers 
accurately identifying goods and services would exist without the distinctiveness criterion in 
trademark law; some degree of efficiency would exist under those common-law torts, neither of 
which requires distinctiveness. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§§ 1–4 (AM. LAW INST. 1993) (omitting a distinctiveness criterion for passing off or unfair com-
petition). So for instance, if a manufacturer copied the name of its competitor, the manufacturer 
would be liable under the common-law tort of passing off. See id. § 4. The tort of passing off alle-
viates consumer confusion without requiring a distinctive mark. See id. As a result, the govern-
ment interest for requiring marks to be distinctive, in view of the doctrines of unfair competition 
and passing off, does not seem compelling. 
 126 See supra notes 70–128 and accompanying text (setting forth arguments for applying one 
of three exceptional free-speech frameworks in the analysis of the anti-disparagement criterion of 
trademark). 
 127 See supra notes 70–121 and accompanying text (concluding that the source-identification 
function of a mark involves an expressive element of the mark and that the distinctiveness criteri-
on targets that expressive element). 
 128 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1338. 
1660 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1639 
sistent with analyzing the distinctiveness criterion under an exceptional free-
speech framework because, as discussed above, the distinctiveness criterion 
also targets an expressive element. The fact that the anti-disparagement crite-
rion targets an expressive element of a mark should not preclude that criterion 
from being analyzed under an exceptional free-speech framework. 
Thus, the majority was simply incorrect to hold that expressive elements 
of a mark should not be evaluated under any of the exceptional free-speech 
frameworks. Although the majority is correct that the anti-disparagement cri-
terion targets an expressive element (disparagement), the distinctiveness crite-
rion also targets an expressive element (self-identification).129 Indeed, as be-
tween the disparaging expression and self-identification expression, the latter 
seems worthier of speech protection than does the former.130 That is, the 
speech value of self-identification expression appears much greater than the 
speech value of disparaging expression: self-identification reflects a consti-
tutional theme of defining one’s own identity, whereas disparagement seems 
akin to hate speech.131 So as between self-identifying speech and disparaging 
speech, the former suggests greater speech value, and thereby a greater need 
for protection from government interference. Hence, if the self-identification 
element of a mark must be subject to one of the exceptional frameworks that 
extends less protection for speech, certainly the disparagement element would 
also be subject to that less speech-protective framework. 
To be clear, this Article does not argue that the expressive nature of the 
source-identification element implies that the anti-disparagement criterion 
does not violate the First Amendment. Instead, this Article observes that the 
same framework that applies in evaluating the distinctiveness criterion 
should apply to the anti-disparagement criterion.132 The fact that the anti-
                                                                                                                           
 129 See supra notes 102–121 and accompanying text. 
 130 Cf. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1367 (Dyk, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[N]either counsel at 
oral argument nor the majority in its opinion has identified any First Amendment value served by 
disparaging speech in the commercial context.”). 
 131 According to Federal Circuit precedent, “a mark may disparage when it dishonors by 
comparison with what is inferior, slights, deprecates, degrades, or affects or injures by unjust 
comparison.” In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). Hate speech 
refers to “speech attacks based on race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation or preference.” 
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 1 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 12:2 (2016). 
 132 One might argue that the two criteria are so distinct in kind and in goal that an exceptional 
framework should apply to one but not the other. This argument, however, stems from the fact that 
one criterion targets content that is distinct from the content that the other criterion targets. The 
constitutionality of that distinction in content plays out in the free-speech analysis of the govern-
ing framework. Specifically, if the targeted content indicates that a criterion is outside the purpose 
of trademark, then that criterion would fail an analysis under the applicable framework. Hence, the 
analyses of the two criteria—under the exceptional framework that governs both criteria—will 
demonstrate whether either criterion is unconstitutional. The point is that the same framework 
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disparagement criterion must be evaluated under an exceptional framework 
does not imply that that criterion is constitutional. An analysis under that 
framework is still necessary, which follows in Part II.133  
C. Strict Scrutiny and Content Restrictions in Trademark 
Section B has concluded that the anti-disparagement criterion must be 
analyzed under one of the three exceptional free-speech frameworks: gov-
ernment subsidy, limited public forum, or commercial speech.134 Traditional-
ly, these frameworks do not employ a strict-scrutiny standard for reviewing 
content discrimination, and that fact has enabled government to exercise lim-
ited content discrimination under any of these frameworks.135 The standard of 
review for the commercial-speech framework, however, has in recent years 
seemed to shift away from this less stringent standard.136 In 2011, the Su-
preme Court decided its most recent commercial-speech case, Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, Inc.  There the Court indicated that content-based restrictions of 
commercial speech must be analyzed under “heightened judicial scrutiny.”137 
It is thought that this “heightened judicial scrutiny” amounts to the more de-
manding standard of strict scrutiny, which would require the government to 
demonstrate a compelling, rather than a mere substantial, interest to justify its 
                                                                                                                           
governs both criteria—as disparate as the criteria may seem—because they both target expressive 
content. 
 133 See infra notes 214–257 and accompanying text. 
 134 See supra notes 61–131 and accompanying text. 
 135 Compare Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226–28 (applying strict scrutiny to content-based regulation, 
and emphasizing that “[c]ontent-based laws—those that target speech based on its communicative 
content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves 
that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests”) (emphasis added), with Rosen-
berger, 515 U.S. at 829 (“The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate pur-
poses for which it was created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the 
discussion of certain topics.”), Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 
549 (1983) (“We have held in several contexts that a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the 
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scruti-
ny.”), and Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (“The State must assert a substantial interest to be 
achieved by restrictions on commercial speech.” (emphasis added)). 
 136 See Sorrell v IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (subjecting commercial speech to 
“heightened judicial scrutiny”). 
 137 Id. The Sorrell Court struck down a Vermont statute that restricted the sale, disclosure, and 
use of pharmacy records relating to individual doctors’ prescribing practices. Id. 
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content-based restriction.138 Sorrell thus seems to erase the less stringent 
standard that the Court has usually accorded commercial speech.139 
In view of Sorrell, the Tam majority applied a strict-scrutiny standard 
in its evaluation of the anti-disparagement criterion, disregarding the argu-
ment that because marks are commercial speech, strict scrutiny should not 
apply.140 The majority reasoned: 
“Commercial speech is no exception” to the need for heightened 
scrutiny of content-based impositions seeking to curtail the com-
munication of particular information or messages. Sorrell, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2664. . . . Strict scrutiny must apply to a government regu-
lation that is directed at the expressive component of speech. That 
the speech is used in commerce or has a commercial component 
should not change the inquiry when the government regulation is 
entirely directed to the expressive component of the speech.141 
The majority thus relied on Sorrell to apply strict scrutiny, reasoning that 
strict scrutiny is appropriate because the anti-disparagement criterion targets 
an expressive element.142 
This application of Sorrell to the trademark context cannot be correct. 
Interpreting Sorrell as imposing strict scrutiny for government regulation 
that targets an expressive element of a mark would call into question all 
content-based restrictions that trademark law imposes on speech.143 At its 
core, trademarks function through content discrimination. Trademark law 
precludes speakers from repeating the specific content that a markholder 
has registered.144 That is to say, by definition, a trademark monopoly means 
that the government is prohibiting private speakers from expressing content 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Off-Label Drug Advertising and the First Amendment, 50 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 81, 99 (2015) (“In Sorrell, the Court seemed sorely tempted to apply the 
full measure of strict scrutiny traditionally triggered by laws that engage in content-based and 
viewpoint-based discrimination.”). 
 139 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2235 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing to Sorrell for the proposition that 
“the Court has applied the heightened ‘strict scrutiny’ standard even in cases where the less strin-
gent ‘commercial speech’ standard was appropriate”). 
 140 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1338 (relying on Sorrell for its application of the heightened 
standard of strict scrutiny). 
 141 Id. (quoting Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 566). 
 142 See id. 
 143 See Tushnet, supra note 1, at *22 (“[I]f subjected to strict or even intermediate scrutiny, 
other parts of the registration system would also perform as poorly as disparagement.”). 
 144 See Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerg-
ing Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 193–94 (noting 
trademark restrictions on second speakers); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 219 (1998) (recognizing 
commercial speech of potential infringers of mark that trademark law restricts). 
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that identifies themselves.145 Recall that self-identification reflects an im-
portant speech value.146 Hence, trademark law restricts speakers from ex-
pressing their own identification on the basis that a markholder has already 
spoken that identification.147 An infringer, then, is merely a second speaker 
of content, and trademark law functions by restricting the content of that 
second speaker. 
A simple example illustrates the point. Consider the trademark on BEN 
CARSON FOR PRESIDENT 2016.148 Suppose that a certain supporter of 
Ben Carson is not the markholder, but would like to sell yard signs that ex-
press support for him by using that message. Trademark law restricts this.149 
As a second speaker of a registered trademark, the supporter faces injunc-
tive and monetary penalties that preclude expressing support of Ben Carson 
through the use of that mark.150 
What justifies trademark’s content-based restrictions of second speak-
ers? The fact that the speech came second in time makes no difference un-
der the First Amendment. As a general principle, second speakers enjoy as 
much constitutional right to articulate expression as do first speakers.151 If 
someone yells “Hillary for President!” on Monday, his or her neighbor has 
as much right to yell it on Tuesday. Hence, without some sort of exception 
to the doctrine against content discrimination, a law that penalizes speakers 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See Denicola, supra note 144, at 193–94; Lemley & Volokh, supra note 144, at 219. 
 146 See supra notes 74–86 and accompanying text. 
 147 Cf. Alex Kozinski, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Boal Memo-
rial Lecture: Trademarks Unplugged (Sept. 16, 1993), in 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 972–73 (1993) 
(“[T]rademarks play a significant role in our public discourse. They often provide some of our most 
vivid metaphors, as well as the most compelling imagery in political campaigns. Some ideas—‘it’s 
the Rolls Royce of its class,’ for example—are difficult to express any other way . . . . Where trade-
marks come to carry so much communicative freight, allowing the trademark holder to restrict their 
use implicates our collective interest in free and open communication.”). 
 148 BEN CARSON FOR PRESIDENT 2016, Registration No. 4890768. 
 149 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012) (imposing civil liability for using a mark in commerce in a 
way that would cause confusion). 
 150 See id. §§ 1116–1117 (setting forth injunctive and monetary relief for trademark viola-
tion). 
 151 The equal protection of speech that occurs either first or second in time is apparent in the 
prior-restraint doctrine of the First Amendment. Supreme Court jurisprudence places a constitu-
tionally “heavy presumption” against any sort of prior restraint. See Org. for a Better Austin v. 
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). Prior restraints often arise as a result of speech that has already 
occurred. The party seeking to silence a speaker does not want the speech content repeated. See, 
e.g., id. at 417 (reciting facts regarding group’s initial distribution of pamphlets critical of com-
mercial enterprise and subsequent injunction entered to silence continued distribution). 
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for expressing certain content because someone else had already expressed 
it seems unconstitutional on its face.152 
Of course, government’s restriction of second-speaker speech through 
trademark law is not unconstitutional. The presence of that fundamental 
restriction for more than two centuries is sufficient to infer its constitution-
ality.153 Trademark’s restriction of second-speaker speech must pass what-
ever free-speech test that it is subject to.154 Nevertheless, that fundamental 
restriction cannot pass a strict-scrutiny analysis.155 Strict scrutiny requires 
that a content-based restriction be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest.156 It is highly unlikely that the promotion of efficiency 
in the commercial marketplace would rise to the level of a compelling gov-
ernment interest.157 Efficiency might amount to a substantial government 
interest but certainly not compelling. 
Trademark’s restriction on second speakers must therefore be analyzed 
within an exceptional free-speech framework—one that recognizes a less-
exacting standard than strict scrutiny. Tellingly, the restriction could not be 
justified under either the subsidy or public-forum frameworks: those frame-
works apply only in the context of government bestowing benefits that influ-
ence speakers’ choice of content ex-ante, whereas trademark’s second-
speaker restrictions impose penalties ex-post.158 The only exceptional free-
                                                                                                                           
 152 Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–19 (2003) (explaining the constitutional excep-
tion for copyright law, which restricts second-speaker speech, such that strict scrutiny does not 
apply in examining provisions of the Copyright Act). 
 153 In England, the first reported trademark case arose in 1742. Blanchard v. Hill, (1742) 26 
Eng. Rep. 692; 2 Atk. 484, 485 (Ch.); see FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 122–45 (1925) (reciting the genesis of modern trade-
mark law); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1839, 1852–55 (2007) (outlining the history of trademark law). 
 154 But see In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1374 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (observing that the PTO has 
denied trademark registration based on the offensiveness of a mark’s content for more than a cen-
tury and this fact did not stop the majority from striking down the anti-disparagement criterion). 
 155 Cf. Tushnet, supra note 1, at *32 (“Overall, it seems unlikely that any but functionality and 
the specifically deception-related provisions of § 2 could survive strict scrutiny, and even a num-
ber of them are shaky because only one—deceptiveness—requires the PTO to show that the de-
ception would affect consumer decisions (materiality).”). 
 156 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226–27 (explaining the strict scrutiny test as requiring the gov-
ernment to prove that the content-based restriction is “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state 
interests”). 
 157 See generally Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in Ameri-
can Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 919 (2009) (noting that a compelling government inter-
est “must be exceptionally strong and very clearly implicated before it can outweigh the speech 
interest” and contrasting the compelling government interest to economic regulations). 
 158 See Martinez, 561 U.S. at 682–83 (describing how limited-public forum affects speech by 
providing a subsidy for content yet to be expressed rather than a penalty for past speech); Finley, 
524 U.S. at 589 (describing the government subsidy effect on speaker’s choice of content). 
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speech framework that could apply to the second-speaker restriction is the 
commercial-speech framework, but only if that framework applies as origi-
nally articulated, without imposing strict scrutiny.159 For the trademark con-
text, as distinct from the medical-records context in Sorrell, the commercial-
speech framework must apply intermediate scrutiny to analyze the content-
based restriction, requiring merely a substantial government interest.160 
Perhaps one might argue that the less speech-protective standard of re-
view that applies in the context of restricting second speakers should not nec-
essarily be imputed to the framework that applies to the anti-disparagement 
criterion. After all, prohibiting potential infringers from copying another’s 
mark hardly seems the same as denying someone a trademark because it is 
disparaging. Punishing a second speaker is very different from denying a 
benefit to a first speaker. The difference, however, favors the argument that 
the less speech-protective standard should apply in evaluating the anti-
disparagement criterion. Compare the consequences of violating the con-
tent-based restrictions: if second speakers repeat another’s mark, govern-
ment imposes a penalty for their speech content through an injunction and 
damages, whereas if first speakers choose certain content as their mark, 
government refrains from giving them a benefit in the form of trademark 
rights.161 Despite the fact that second speakers face harsher consequences 
for speaking content, a less speech-protective standard governs (i.e., not 
strict scrutiny).162 So if a less speech-protective standard applies in the situ-
ation where speakers are facing harsh consequences, the argument is 
stronger to apply that same less-speech protective standard in the situation 
where speakers face mild consequences.163 Put simply, if intermediate scru-
tiny applies where penalties for speech are at stake, then certainly interme-
diate scrutiny would apply where mere incentives for speech are at stake. 
Thus, any examination of whether the anti-disparagement criterion 
violates free speech must occur within one of the exceptional free-speech 
frameworks. That framework must not apply a strict-scrutiny standard. 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564–66. 
 160 See id. at 564 (“The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions 
on commercial speech.”). 
 161 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012) (setting forth injunctive and monetary relief for in-
fringement), with id. § 1052 (setting forth conditions for rejecting trademark registration). 
 162 See Denicola, supra note 144, at 193–94 (observing that trademark’s restrictions of second 
speakers are analyzed under the commercial-speech framework). 
 163 Cf. Martinez, 561 U.S. at 683 (“Application of the less restrictive limited-public-forum 
analysis better accounts for the fact that [the state actor], through its [student organization] pro-
gram, is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of prohibition.”). 
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II. DISPARAGEMENT AND THE PURPOSE OF TRADEMARK LAW 
Given that the anti-disparagement criterion should be analyzed under 
one of the free-speech exceptional frameworks, the issue of substance be-
comes whether the anti-disparagement criterion supports the purpose of 
trademark law. Under any of the three frameworks, this inquiry is crucial to 
determining whether the criterion is constitutional. In the subsidy frame-
work, government can employ content-based criteria only if the criteria 
support the purpose of the subsidy program.164 In the limited-public-forum 
framework, government can employ content-based criteria for use of the 
forum only if the criteria support the purpose of the forum.165 Thus, under 
the frameworks of government subsidies or limited-public forums, the cen-
tral question is whether the disparagement criterion supports the purpose of 
trademark law. Under the commercial-speech framework, the speech analy-
sis raises a similar question. The government can employ content-based 
restrictions on commercial speech only if the government acts because of a 
purpose or interest that is substantial and through means that are substan-
tially related to that purpose.166 Hence, the relevant question in the com-
mercial-speech framework is whether the anti-disparagement criterion is 
substantially related to the purpose of trademark. Therefore, in any of the 
three frameworks, the dispositive inquiry is whether the disparagement cri-
terion supports, or directly relates to, the purpose of trademark law. 
In order to analyze whether the anti-disparagement criterion supports the 
purpose of trademark law, it is necessary to understand the scope of the pur-
pose. If the scope of trademark’s purpose is narrow, the anti-disparagement 
criterion is less likely to support it, whereas if the scope of the purpose is 
broad, the criterion is more likely to support it. Thus, defining the purpose 
of trademark law is crucial to resolving whether the anti-disparagement cri-
                                                                                                                           
 164 See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2013) 
(“[T]he relevant distinction that has emerged from our cases is between conditions that define the 
limits of the government spending program—those that specify the activities Congress wants to 
subsidize—and conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of 
the program itself.”). 
 165 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“The 
necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created 
may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”). 
 166 See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010) (inter-
preting intermediate scrutiny in commercial-speech context to mean that the content-based re-
striction “must directly advance a substantial governmental interest and be no more extensive than 
is necessary to serve that interest” (quotation omitted)); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564–66 (1980) (requiring government restriction of com-
mercial speech to directly advance the state interest involved). 
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terion is constitutional.167 The inquiry into whether the anti-disparagement 
criterion supports the purpose of trademark law must first examine what 
that purpose is.168 Hence, the two sections below examine the purposes of 
trademark law and whether the anti-disparagement criterion supports those 
purposes.169 
A. Information Quality and Marketplace Efficiency 
Improving the quality of information in the marketplace is often cited 
as a reason for trademark law. More precisely, improving the quality of in-
formation for consumers is a reason for trademark’s provision of exclusive 
rights and for trademark’s bar against deceptive marks.170 Exclusivity en-
                                                                                                                           
 167 None of the opinions in the Federal Circuit’s Tam decision give much thought to the scope 
of the purpose of trademark law. The majority opinion states that “[t]he purpose of the Lanham 
Act is to . . . prevent customer confusion, and protect the goodwill of markholders.” In re Tam, 
808 F.3d 1321, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 1587871 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 
15-1293). Although trademark law does serve these purposes, the majority failed to consider 
whether other purposes are present in trademark law. See id. Similarly, the majority did not con-
sider whether a broader purpose that encompasses these two specific purposes might underlie the 
Lanham Act. See id. The dissent of Judge Reyna provides an example of such a broader purpose, 
i.e., “to promote the orderly flow of commerce.” Id. at 1378 (Reyna, J., dissenting). Like the ma-
jority, however, Judge Reyna does not provide analysis to support this conclusion. See id. Neither 
the majority nor Judge Reyna provide support for their respective definitions of trademark’s pur-
pose. Purpose, as indicated above, is the linchpin of the constitutional issue. 
 168 Statements of purpose in the Lanham Act are not much help in defining the purpose of that 
Act. The Act claims a seemingly broad purpose in its statement: “The intent of this chapter is to 
regulate commerce within the control of Congress.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). Yet “to regulate 
commerce” is merely a re-statement of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, which 
means that the Lanham Act defines its purpose as exercising its power. It makes no sense to say 
that the purpose of exercising a power is to exercise a power. Indeed, such a purposeless power 
suggests that its arbitrary and capricious exercise would be permissible. This cannot be, for as a 
constitutional matter, there are some purposes for which Congress cannot exercise its power. Con-
gress may not exercise its power to circumvent constitutional rights of its citizens. See Agency for 
Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2328 (“Government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that 
infringes his constitutionally protected freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that 
benefit.” (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006))); Elrod v. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361 (1976) (“The denial of a public benefit may not be used by the govern-
ment for the purpose of creating an incentive enabling it to achieve what it may not command 
directly.”). Hence, the Lanham Act’s purported purpose does not assist in understanding its actual 
purpose. 
 169 See infra notes 170–215 and accompanying text. 
 170 See Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The purpose for 
which trademark law accords merchants the exclusive right to the use of a name or symbol in their 
area or commerce is identification, so that the merchants can establish goodwill for their goods 
based on past satisfactory performance, and the consuming public can rely on a mark as a guaran-
tee that the goods or services so marked come from the merchant who has been found to be satis-
factory in the past.”); McKenna, supra note 153, at 1844 (“It would be difficult to overstate the 
level of consensus among commentators that the goal of trademark law is—and always has 
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sures that only one mark is present in any given area of commerce, which in 
turn prevents consumer confusion, enabling consumers to easily identify the 
producer of a good.171 The bar against deception reduces the likelihood that 
consumers will rely on inaccurate information in deciding to purchase a 
good.172 Thus, trademark’s exclusivity and its bar against deception yield 
better quality information for consumers. 
This purpose of better information for consumers, however, is not the 
sole purpose of trademark law. Trademark law does not promote better in-
formation for the sake of better information.173 Given that Congress’s 
                                                                                                                           
been—to improve the quality of information in the marketplace and thereby reduce consumer 
search costs.”). 
 171 See MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 2:2 (observing that trademark “serves to protect . . . 
consumers from deception and confusion”). 
 172 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 n.15 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (quoting a Senate report articulating that one of the purposes of trademark is “pro-
tect[ing] the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-
mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get”); 
McKenna, supra note 153, at 1844 (“By preserving the integrity of these symbols, trademark law 
benefits consumers . . . by protecting them from being deceived into buying products they do not 
want . . . .”). 
 173 If the sole end of trademark were better information, then knowledge would be the focus 
of trademark. Knowledge, however, is the focus of copyright, not trademark. Compare U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating the copyright power as a power “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts”), with id. cl. 3 (stating the commerce power as a power “[t]o regulate 
Commerce”); see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) (“The ‘Progress of Science,’ 
petitioners acknowledge, refers broadly to the creation and spread of knowledge and learning.” 
(quotation omitted)). 
 The constitutional distinction between trademark and copyright was set forth in 1879 in In re 
Trade-Mark Cases, in which the Supreme Court declared that, if Congress possessed any power to 
regulate trademark, that power must arise under the Commerce Clause. 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) 
(striking down the original 1870 Trademark Act as insufficiently tied to interstate or foreign 
commerce). The Court contrasted trademark with the copyright power arising under the Intellectu-
al Property Clause. Despite this constitutional distinction, the Tam majority appeared greatly un-
comfortable with any implication its holding might create in copyright law. See 808 F.3d at 1354. 
The majority explained its discomfort as follows: 
In many ways, trademark registration resembles copyright registration. Under the 
logic of the government’s approach, it follows that the government could refuse to 
register copyrights without the oversight of the First Amendment . . . . This idea—
that the government can control speech by denying the benefits of copyright regis-
tration to disfavored speech—is anathema to the First Amendment. 
Id. If the government could withhold trademark based on content, the government could withhold 
copyright based on content, and that latter outcome, the majority concluded, “is anathema to the 
First Amendment.” Id. 
 The majority’s logic is flawed. The Constitution requires Congress to legislate trademark con-
sistent with the Commerce Clause, not the Copyright Clause. Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause is distinct from its power under the Copyright Clause. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8., 
with id. cl. 3. The constitutional rules that govern trademark do not imply the same set of rules for 
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trademark power arises under the Commerce Clause, trademark must pro-
mote better information for reasons relating to commerce.174 Enabling better 
information is therefore a mere means for a broader commercial purpose: 
marketplace efficiency.175 Specifically, better information for consumers 
fosters a reputation for producers.176 Producers gain a reputation for the 
quality of their goods because trademark enables consumers to identify and 
distinguish producers and their goods.177 This fosters investment in quality 
goods by producers.178 Moreover, better information lowers search costs for 
consumers to identify the producer of a good and to identify actual attrib-
utes of the good itself.179 Lower search costs facilitate commercial transac-
                                                                                                                           
copyright. Hence, the fact that content discrimination is permissible in trademark does not imply as a 
constitutional matter that content discrimination is permissible in copyright. 
 On the merits of the majority’s argument, authority suggests that Congress could indeed exer-
cise content-based discrimination under the Copyright Clause. Tellingly, the majority provides no 
basis for its assertion that content discrimination in copyright law is “anathema to the First 
Amendment.” Id. at 1354. Indeed, the majority’s attempt to foreclose content discrimination in 
trademark does not detract from the authority suggesting the constitutionality of content discrimi-
nation in copyright. In particular, the language of the Copyright Clause itself suggests a power of 
content discrimination: the Copyright Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Pro-
gress of Science” through implementing a copyright system. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. A pow-
er to promote progress in science suggests a power to determine which content to copyright—that 
which promotes progress. That discussion, however, is for another day. See Ned Snow, Discrimi-
nation in the Copyright Clause, 67 ALA. L. REV. 583, 585–633 (2016) (arguing that the Copyright 
Clause gives Congress a power to discriminate in extending copyright based on content); Snow, 
supra note 44, at 1523 (arguing that content-based copyright denial does not violate the First 
Amendment); Tushnet, supra note 1, at *41 (“[T]he government could indeed withdraw or refuse 
to grant copyright protection to categories of works without violating the First Amendment.”). 
And that is the important point here. The discussion of content discrimination under the Copyright 
Clause has no bearing on the discussion of whether Congress may exercise content discrimination 
under the Commerce Clause. Nor does the answer to the Commerce Clause question imply that 
Congress does or does not have the same authority under the Copyright Clause. They are two 
separate clauses with two separate analyses. 
 174 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92–94. 
 175 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 
TRADEMARK REP. 267, 267 (1988) (“The overall conclusion is that trademark law . . . can best be 
explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency.”). 
 176 See MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 2.4. 
 177 See id. 
 178 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“[Trademark] law 
helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-
related rewards associated with a desirable product.”). 
 179 Id. at 163–64. (“In principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-
identifying mark, reduces the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions, for 
it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made 
by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past.” 
(quotation omitted)). 
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tions. Thus, better information for consumers serves the broader purpose of 
marketplace efficiency.180 
Given the purpose of marketplace efficiency, the question becomes 
whether the anti-disparagement criterion supports this purpose. At first 
glance, it would seem not. As the majority notes, “the disparagement pro-
scription has never been alleged to prevent consumer confusion or decep-
tion.”181 Furthermore, disparaging marks do not prevent a producer from 
gaining a reputation and indeed such marks may foster a specific sort of repu-
tation. Hence, at first glance, the anti-disparagement criterion does not seem 
to promote better information nor does it seem to promote market efficien-
cy.182 
On reflection, however, disparaging marks do appear to disrupt com-
mercial transactions. Judge Reyna argued in dissent: “Commercial speech 
that insults groups of people, particularly based on their race, gender, reli-
gion, or other demographic identity, tends to disrupt commercial activity 
and to undermine the stability of the marketplace in much the same manner 
as discriminatory conduct.”183 This argument makes sense.  Disparaging 
marks may drive consumers away from commercial transactions and not 
because of the reputation of a good, but rather, because of disagreement 
with the message within the disparaging opinion.184 In many instances, the 
disparaging opinion may have nothing to do with the good itself.185 Indeed, 
given that marks that are more distinctive receive stronger trademark pro-
tection, the distinctiveness criterion encourages any disparaging opinion not 
                                                                                                                           
 180 See Landes & Posner, supra note 175, at 267. Professors Mark Lemley and Stacey Dogan 
explain the broader purposes of trademark as follows: 
While the reduction of consumer search costs and the encouragement of goodwill 
investment represent critical intermediate objectives of the trademark system, nei-
ther of these goals is an end in itself. The law reduces consumer search costs in or-
der to facilitate the functioning of a competitive marketplace. Informed consumers 
will make better-informed purchases, which will increase their overall utility and 
push producers to develop better quality products. Trademark law, then, aims to 
promote more competitive markets by improving the quality of information in those 
markets. 
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accom-
pli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 467 (2005). 
 181 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1354. 
 182 See id. 
 183 See id. at 1379 (Reyna, J., dissenting). 
 184 See id. at 1380. 
 185 For instance, the mark, HAVE YOU HEARD SATAN IS A REPUBLICAN, which was 
attached to clothing goods, was denied protection as a disparaging mark. See id. at 1359 (O’Malley, 
J., concurring); HAVE YOU HEARD SATAN IS A REPUBLICAN, Serial No. 85077647 (filed 
July 2, 2010). 
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to describe characteristics of the good.186 Hence, where a consumer takes 
offense at the disparaging opinion, that offense likely is not related to the 
good itself. The offense is due to an opinion that is often irrelevant to the 
market transaction. Some consumers of football games, for instance, may 
refrain from attending Redskins games because they disagree with the dis-
paraging proposition of the REDSKINS mark—not because they fail to en-
joy football or because of the quality of the Redskins organization. Simply 
put, disparaging opinions may interfere with efficient transactions. 
One might argue, however, that some disparaging marks actually pro-
mote efficient transactions. Some disparaging marks describe their goods, 
and some simply appeal to consumers independent of their goods. If dispar-
aging marks describe goods that are themselves disparaging or otherwise 
offensive, then likely the disparaging opinion in that mark would not likely 
interfere with the potential consumer’s purchase of the good. That is to say, 
a potential consumer who would be interested in purchasing a disparaging 
good would not be offended by the disparaging opinion of the mark. For 
instance, if REDSKINS were the title of a book that disparaged Native 
Americans, any potential consumer who would not be offended by the con-
tent of the book would also not be offended by the content of the RED-
SKINS title.187 Similarly, some disparaging marks appeal to consumers, 
regardless of whether they describe the good. In the football context, some 
football fans prefer REDSKINS as the mark for their football team.188 In 
such situations, the disparaging mark does not seem to interfere with market 
transactions, and indeed, the disparaging mark seems to promote those 
transactions.189 
This argument is unconvincing. The fact that some consumers may not 
be offended by either the mark or the good (such that the consumers thereby 
enter the transaction) does not change the fact that some consumers are of-
fended by the mark (and thereby do not enter the transaction). It would 
seem that consumers who are not offended by the mark would still enter the 
transaction for the good even without the disparaging mark. Regardless of 
whether the football team is known by the disparaging REDSKINS mark or 
the non-disparaging INDIANS mark, consumers purchase football tickets. 
That said, arguably some consumers enter transactions only if the disparag-
ing mark is present. The question, then, is simple: do more consumers re-
frain from entering transactions because of the presence of a disparaging 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 187 The mark may also opine about the use of the disparaging term, arguing against that use. 
E.g., C. RICHARD KING, REDSKINS: INSULT & BRAND (2016). 
 188 See Snyder, supra note 83. 
 189 See id. 
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mark rather than because of the absence of the disparaging mark? On bal-
ance, it would seem that more refrain because of the mark’s presence than 
because of the mark’s absence. Admittedly, the truthfulness of this proposi-
tion may never be known; however, the proposition does seem reasona-
ble.190 Therefore, the fact that disparaging marks may interfere with mar-
ketplace transactions appears sufficient to conclude that Congress has a rea-
sonable basis for believing that denying trademark protection for such 
marks will promote a more efficient marketplace. 
One might also argue that the anti-disparagement criterion does not di-
rectly promote efficient transactions. Arguably, the bar that precludes dis-
paraging marks only indirectly promotes commercial efficiency. As an indi-
rect means for promoting the government interest, the restriction arguably 
seems more extensive than necessary.191 
This argument is also unconvincing. Other means that trademark law 
employs to promote commercial efficiency are at least as indirect as the an-
ti-disparagement criterion. Specifically, trademark’s requirement of distinc-
tiveness only indirectly results in markholders realizing an efficient return 
on their investment in the quality of goods offered to consumers.192 Distinc-
tiveness enables consumers to recognize a trademark as communicating the 
source of a good, which then may effectuate a reputation for a markholder; 
upon gaining a reputation, a markholder can realize a return on his or her 
investment in producing quality goods only as consumers make subsequent 
purchases based on that reputation.193 Hence, the purported efficiency—
                                                                                                                           
 190 Even assuming that more consumers refrain from entering transactions because the dispar-
aging mark is not present, the result of precluding registration for disparaging marks still appears 
to promote efficiency in the marketplace. Consumers refraining from entering a transaction owing 
to the absence of a mark arise in two situations. First, some consumers enter the transaction only 
because they agree with the mark’s disparaging proposition. In that situation, the disparaging 
proposition is more attractive than the quality of the good itself; without the disparaging proposi-
tion, they simply won’t purchase the good. This situation would lead to the market price failing to 
reflect consumer demand for the actual good, and consequently, the price for the good would be 
inaccurate. 
 Second, some consumers enter the transaction only because the disparaging mark conveys 
information about the good itself. In that situation, the disparaging proposition describes the good 
(e.g., REDSKINS as a title of a book that disparages Native Americans). This situation would lead 
to the mark failing to efficiently indicate brand; consumers are less likely to understand marks that 
describe a good as indicating source. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9. Hence, disparaging marks 
that describe their goods are inefficient indicators of source. 
 191 See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., 559 U.S. at 249 (explaining that a content-based 
restriction in the commercial speech context must “be no more extensive than is necessary to serve 
that interest” (quotation omitted)). 
 192 See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163–64 (explaining the indirect benefits of trademark 
rights). 
 193 See id. 
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markholders realizing a return on their investment in producing quality 
goods—is merely an indirect result of the distinctiveness criterion.194 
In response, one might argue that the distinctiveness criterion also serves 
a more direct means for promoting marketplace efficiency. Distinctiveness 
directly prevents potential confusion by consumers over the source of a good, 
and confusion would hinder commercial transactions.195 So one effect of the 
distinctiveness criterion—preventing possible consumer confusion—does 
directly support the purpose of trademark. Yet the anti-disparagement criteri-
on is no different. It directly prevents possible consumer offense that would 
hinder commercial transactions.196 The fact that the anti-disparagement cri-
terion does not target confusion over source does not suggest that the crite-
rion is not directly facilitating commercial transactions. Indeed, it is well 
established that a criterion for trademark protection need not address source 
confusion to further commercial transactions. Consider the anti-deception 
criterion.197 Trademark’s bar against deceptive marks does not further 
source identification.198 Rather, the anti-deception criterion furthers good 
identification: consumers can better identify the goods that they purchase if 
the mark does not deceive consumers as to properties of that good.199 Hence, 
the anti-deception criterion directly furthers commercial transactions without 
promoting source identification, as does the anti-disparagement criterion. 
In sum, the majority’s conclusion that the anti-disparagement criterion 
does not support the purpose of trademark ignores the premise that preventing 
consumer confusion and deception serve a broader purpose—promoting mar-
ketplace efficiency.200 Trademark promotes efficiency by facilitating means 
for providing consumers with quality information about commercial transac-
tions. Quality information includes not only accurate information about the 
producer and the good, but also non-offensive information that would other-
                                                                                                                           
 194 Cf. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 434 (1993) (“[A] regula-
tion limiting commercial speech can, in fact, be more extensive than is necessary to serve the 
government’s interest as long as it is not unreasonably so.”). 
 195 See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163–64. 
 196 See supra notes 183–190 and accompanying text (explaining how the anti-disparagement 
criterion’s prevention of consumer offense furthers commercial transactions). 
 197 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012). 
 198 A mark is deceptive only if it misdescribes the good, not the source. See In re Budge Mfg. 
Co., 857 F.2d 773, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the test for determining deceptiveness of a 
mark). Deceptive marks can indicate source in the same way that an arbitrary mark does, given 
that arbitrary marks do not describe the good but are nonetheless associated with the source. See 
Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1983). Hence, a 
meaning that does not describe the good does not imply that a mark cannot identify source. 
 199 See McKenna, supra note 153, at 1844. 
 200 See supra notes 170–180 and accompanying text. 
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wise interfere with the commercial transaction. In this way, the anti-
disparagement criterion supports the purpose of trademark law. 
B. Markholder Goodwill and the Collective Marketplace 
Another purpose of trademark law is to protect markholders’ good-
will.201 Consumers associate the mark with the reputation that a markholder 
has established for its goods, thereby creating goodwill toward the markhold-
er.202 At first blush, this purpose may not seem relevant to whether the anti-
disparagement criterion supports the purpose of trademark. Prohibiting a 
markholder from choosing a disparaging mark does not seem relevant to pro-
tecting the markholder’s goodwill. Protecting goodwill, however, is relevant 
to the anti-disparagement criterion because goodwill protection serves a 
broader purpose. Protecting goodwill encourages markholders to invest in 
their products and marks, and with this greater investment, the marketplace 
realizes the collective benefit of a healthier, more robust forum for commer-
cial transactions.203 Consequently, the purpose of protecting markholders’ 
goodwill appears to serve a broader purpose of promoting the collective mar-
ketplace.204 
                                                                                                                           
 201 See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1982) (“Such blatant 
trademark infringement inhibits competition and subverts both goals of the Lanham Act. By ap-
plying a trademark to goods produced by one other than the trademark’s owner, the infringer de-
prives the owner of the goodwill which he spent energy, time, and money to obtain. At the same 
time, the infringer deprives consumers of their ability to distinguish among the goods of compet-
ing manufacturers.” (citations omitted)); MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 2:1. 
 202 See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164 (“[Trademark] law helps assure a producer that it (and 
not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a 
desirable product. The law thereby encourages the production of quality products, and simultane-
ously discourages those who hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer’s inabil-
ity quickly to evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale.” (quotation omitted) (citations omit-
ted)). 
 203 See id.; Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (“National 
protection of trademarks is desirable, Congress concluded, because trademarks foster competition 
and the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.”). 
 The purpose of protecting markholders is particularly apparent in the doctrine of dilution. 
Trademark restricts second speakers from using a mark in a way that is likely to dilute the mark. See 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). Dilution constitutes any use that could lessen the capacity of a famous 
mark to distinguish its good. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 420–21 (2003). 
Importantly, dilution may occur even if consumer confusion is not present. See id. at 429. For in-
stance, if someone sells pianos and names his store Kodak, he has diluted Kodak’s mark even though 
consumers would not likely believe that the camera manufacturer is the source of the piano store. See 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995). Hence, the purpose of the dilution doctrine is to benefit mar-
kholders rather than consumers . See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of 
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1698 (1999) (observing the fundamental shift in trademark 
protection from benefiting consumers to benefiting famous markholders). 
 204 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 180, at 467 (recognizing broader purpose of promoting 
competitive markets as underlying trademark’s encouragement of markholder goodwill). 
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This broader purpose suggests that the anti-disparagement criterion is 
permissible. In certain instances, protecting the goodwill of a particular mar-
kholder might contravene the very purpose for that protection. In those in-
stances, protecting the goodwill of those markholders is contrary to the 
broader purpose of trademark law. That is, if a markholder hinders the collec-
tive marketplace, then promoting goodwill for that markholder would be con-
trary to the very purpose for promoting goodwill in the first place. For exam-
ple, suppose that the use of expletives as marks yields a negative effect for the 
collective marketplace. Assuming there is evidence that supports this supposi-
tion, would it make sense to extend trademark protection for expletives?205  
Likely not. Protecting goodwill of such a mark and its markholder would con-
travene the very purpose for protecting goodwill in the first place—to pro-
mote the collective marketplace. Encouraging such marks would inhibit the 
purpose of trademark. Therefore, the reason that trademark protects the 
goodwill of a markholder (i.e., to promote the collective marketplace) sug-
gests that Congress may deny protection for certain categories of marks 
where those categories would undermine the broader purpose. 
This interpretation of the purpose of trademark law draws support 
from a provision in the Lanham Act distinct from the anti-disparagement 
provision. In addition to the anti-disparagement provision, the Lanham Act 
has a provision that designates a content-based category as falling outside 
of protection.206 Section 2(b) of the Lanham Act bars trademark protection 
for any mark that “[c]onsists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or oth-
er insignia of the United States, or of any State or municipality, or of any 
foreign nation, or any simulation thereof.”207 By designating that govern-
ment symbols are ineligible for trademark registration, section 2(b) repre-
sents a content-based bar for trademark protection.208 Notably, the expres-
sion of government symbols receives a high degree of speech protection as 
political speech.209 Why does the Lanham Act deny protection for such con-
tent? Certainly the denial is not for reasons of market efficiency.210 Nor 
                                                                                                                           
 205 Another example might be marks that promote prostitution. If evidence supports the view 
that such marks harm the collective marketplace—perhaps causing negative externalities—
arguably Congress could deny those marks trademark protection. Nevertheless, a denial of marks 
that promote prostitution would still be subject to a viewpoint-discrimination challenge. See infra 
notes 217–262 and accompanying text. 
 206 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b) (2012). 
 207 Id. 
 208 See id. Tellingly, the majority did not suggest that its holding invalidated the § 2(b) con-
tent-based bar. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1321–58. 
 209 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 417–20 (1989) (recognizing destruction of flags as 
protected political speech). 
 210 Government symbols could serve as distinctive marks such that consumers could better 
identify source. This is especially true where the source is a government actor. Nevertheless, even 
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does the denial seem to directly promote commerce.211 Rather, the denial 
reflects Congress’s judgment that this content should not be the subject of a 
commercial transaction.212 Stated differently, Congress has judged that the 
effect of protecting these marks would be undesirable for collective socie-
ty.213 
This government-symbol bar is further notable because the apparent 
undesirable effect of extending trademark to those symbols does not appear 
to be with respect to marketplace participants, but instead, the undesirable 
effect appears to be with respect to collective society. The commercial mar-
ketplace does not seem better off by denying government symbols. Indeed, 
the commercial marketplace would seem better off by allowing the symbols 
to be protected; trademarking government symbols would enable consumers 
to more easily identify source, especially where the source of a good is a 
government entity. On the other hand, the effects on collective society of 
trademarking government symbols would apparently be undesirable. As Pro-
fessor McCarthy explains, the reason for the government-symbol bar is that 
such symbols should “not be sullied or debased by use as symbols in busi-
ness and trade.”214 Thus, the government-symbol bar is a clear example of 
Congress choosing to refrain from protecting goodwill of particular mar-
kholders to further a social purpose that is broader than promoting the com-
mercial marketplace. Precisely because trademark law governs the commer-
cial marketplace, Congress has chosen to deny trademark protection for this 
category of content. Simply put, Congress is divorcing this content from the 
commercial marketplace for the greater good of societal interests.215 
The upshot of this discussion is that the purpose of promoting the col-
lective marketplace through protecting the goodwill of markholders in-
cludes the ability to refrain from protecting that goodwill for marks that 
would be detrimental to the marketplace, or for that matter, that would be 
detrimental to collective society generally. Like the government-symbol bar, 
the anti-disparagement criterion represents an attempt by Congress to keep 
                                                                                                                           
where the source is a government actor, the Lanham Act precludes registration of the government 
symbol as a mark. See In re City of Houston, 731 F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (denying 
trademark protection for a government symbol used by city of Houston). 
 211 Cf. Tushnet, supra note 1, at *28 (observing that the government-symbol bar does not exist 
to prevent confusion). 
 212 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
§ 19:78 (4th ed. 2016) (explaining that the purpose of the § 2(b) bar against government symbols 
is so that those symbols will “not be sullied or debased by use as symbols in business and trade”). 
 213 See id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 To borrow language from the majority, it is “a mark’s expressive character, not its ability 
to serve as a source identifier, that is the basis for the [government-symbol] exclusion from regis-
tration.” See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1338. 
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certain content out of the commercial marketplace. As discussed in the sec-
tion above, there is good reason for this attempt: the anti-disparagement 
criterion discourages marks that are likely to disrupt marketplace transac-
tions.216 Furthermore, such marks may cause negative effects on collective 
society. Yet regardless of those broader implications, the anti-disparagement 
criterion denies goodwill for a category of marks that appear to hinder the 
collective marketplace, and that is sufficient to find that the criterion sup-
ports the purpose of trademark law. 
III. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION 
In In re Tam, the majority concluded that the anti-disparagement crite-
rion is viewpoint discriminatory.217 If true, this conclusion would dispose of 
any argument that the anti-disparagement criterion is constitutional. Alt-
hough subject-matter content discrimination may be permissible in some 
situations, viewpoint discrimination never is.218 So even if the anti-
disparagement criterion must be analyzed under an exceptional free-speech 
framework, and even if that criterion supports the purpose of trademark law, 
the criterion would violate the First Amendment if it were viewpoint dis-
criminatory.219 This Part therefore examines whether the criterion is view-
point discriminatory.220 
In reaching its conclusion that the anti-disparagement criterion is 
viewpoint discriminatory, the majority employed two rationales.221 First, the 
government offers protection to viewpoints that are opposite of disparaging 
viewpoints.222 Second, the meaning of disparagement depends on the view-
point of a private group.223 As discussed in the two sections below, these 
rationales are inconsistent with existing trademark doctrines.224 
                                                                                                                           
 216 See supra notes 183–200 and accompanying text. 
 217 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 1587871 
(U.S. Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 15-1293). 
 218 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387–88, 391 (1992). 
 219 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011) (noting that viewpoint discrimi-
nation is not permissible in the commercial-speech framework); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. 
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998) (commenting that viewpoint discrimination is not permissible in 
the government-subsidy framework); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 829 (1995) (precluding viewpoint discrimination in the context of the limited-public forum). 
 220 See infra notes 225–262 and accompanying text. 
 221 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1336–37. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. at 1337. 
 224 See infra notes 225–262 and accompanying text. 
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A. Marks That Disparage and Marks That Praise 
The majority concluded that the anti-disparagement criterion “is view-
point discriminatory on its face.”225 It reasoned that the “PTO rejects marks 
under [the anti-disparagement criterion] when it finds the marks refer to a 
group in a negative way, but it permits the registration of marks that refer to 
a group in a positive, non-disparaging manner.”226 The majority’s reasoning 
is thus simple: rejecting one type of proposition (propositions that dispar-
age), without rejecting the contrary type of proposition (propositions that 
praise), is viewpoint discriminatory.227 In effect, the majority reasoned that 
the disparity in treatment between categories of views indicates viewpoint 
discrimination.228 
This reasoning suggests that another provision of the Lanham Act is 
viewpoint discriminatory, namely, the provision that denies trademark pro-
tection for marks that are deceptive—i.e., the anti-deception criterion.229 
Both disparaging and deceptive marks make propositions that the Lanham 
Act rejects: disparaging marks make propositions that dishonor a group;230 
deceptive marks make propositions that are deceitful about a good.231 Be-
cause the opposite types of propositions receive protection (i.e., marks that 
praise a group and marks that are truthful about a good), then the disparity 
in treatment of views for both disparaging and deceptive marks indicates—
under the majority’s reasoning—that viewpoint discrimination is present. 
That is, if viewpoint discrimination follows from the mere fact that the 
Lanham Act denies protection for a general type of proposition, then under 
that reasoning, it would seem that the Lanham Act’s anti-deception criterion 
would be viewpoint discriminatory. 
One might argue that because deception concerns a portrayal of facts 
whereas disparagement concerns a speaker’s opinion, deception does not 
reflect a viewpoint whereas disparagement does. This argument has 
strength. Consider, for instance, a football franchise that represents its team 
by using the mark, THE NATIVE AMERICANS, when in fact, the team is 
not comprised of Native American players. This mark seems deceptive be-
                                                                                                                           
 225 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1336–37. 
 226 Id. at 1336. 
 227 See id. at 1336–37. 
 228 See id. 
 229 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012). 
 230 See In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A] mark may disparage when it 
dishonors by comparison with what is inferior, slights, deprecates, degrades, or affects or injures 
by unjust comparison.” (quotations omitted)). 
 231 See In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1047, 2002 WL 523343 (T.T.A.B. 
2002) (requiring that a deceptive mark misdescribes a good). 
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cause there are no Native Americans on the team despite its mark. Yet the 
mark does not seem viewpoint discriminatory because there does not appear 
to be any subjectivity in determining the accuracy of the proposition in the 
mark. The proposition seems objectively false. On the other hand, RED-
SKINS as a disparaging mark for a football team reflects a subjective be-
lieve that Native Americans are an inferior race.232 The subjective opinion 
inherent in the disparaging mark arguably suggests that disparagement re-
flects viewpoints more so than objectively verifiable statements of fact. 
Whereas deceptive marks seem to turn on objective states of affairs, dispar-
aging marks seem to turn on subjective viewpoints. Hence, it may be argued 
that prohibiting deceptiveness does not amount to a prohibition of view-
points in contrast to prohibiting disparagement. 
This subjective-objective basis for distinguishing between viewpoint 
and subject-matter discrimination suggests some unusual consequences out-
side of trademark law. If subjective beliefs receive greater speech protection 
as viewpoints, and objectively verifiable beliefs receive lesser speech pro-
tection as subject-matter content, then hate speech would seem more worthy 
of speech protection than would Darwin’s theory of evolution or a belief 
that Democrats raise taxes more than Republicans. This cannot be.233 First 
Amendment jurisprudence well recognizes a hierarchy of protection, and 
hate speech is not at the top of the list.234 This Article limits its discussion, 
however, to the internal consistency of trademark law, leaving the abstract 
discussion about the difference between viewpoint and subject-matter dis-
crimination to the speech theorists. 
Trademark law indicates that the subjective-objective basis for distin-
guishing between the anti-deception and the anti-disparagement criteria is 
flawed. In particular, the trademark test for determining whether a mark is 
deceptive suggests a high degree of subjectivity in the analysis. Three ele-
ments must be present for a mark to be deceptive: (1) the mark must misde-
scribe the good; (2) consumers must believe the misdescription to be an accu-
rate statement about the goods; and (3) that misdescription must materially 
                                                                                                                           
 232 See Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516 (T.T.A.B. 
2014), aff’d sub nom, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 486 (E.D.V.A. 2015), 
appeal filed, No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015) (concluding that REDSKINS disparages a sub-
stantial portion of Native Americans). 
 233 Cf. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822–23, 831, 846 (holding unconstitutional a state universi-
ty’s exclusion of funding for student papers that manifest belief about “an ultimate reality”); Si-
mon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (holding uncon-
stitutional a state law that penalized authors for narrating their past crimes). 
 234 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 422–23 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Our First Amendment decisions 
have created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech. Core political speech 
occupies the highest, most protected position.”). 
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affect the purchasing decision of the relevant consumer pool.235 With respect 
to the first prong, it is not always clear whether a mark is misdescribing a 
good. For instance, does the mark CU misdescribe a dietary supplement?236 
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board held CU to be misdescriptive because 
the supplement contained no copper.237 Consider also BREATHASURE for a 
breath freshener. Does the lack of scientific evidence proving that the breath 
freshener actually produces fresh breath mean that BREATHASURE reflects 
a false claim? One court believed so.238 These examples illustrate that the 
question of whether a mark misdescribes a good—whether a statement is in 
fact false—may invite subjective opinion.239 
As already mentioned, the second and third prongs of the test for de-
ception are that consumers must believe the misdescription to be an accu-
rate statement about the goods and that the misdescription must materially 
affect their purchasing decisions. In assessing the subjectivity of these in-
quiries, it is relevant that the PTO does not always examine actual consumer 
beliefs: the PTO may consider the plausibility and likelihood of such be-
liefs, publicly available information, and “common sense.”240 Mere opin-
ions concerning the beliefs of the relevant consumer pool (as well as con-
cerning which members of the public comprise the relevant consumer pool) 
invite subjectivity into the inquiries. Consider HOLEPROOF as a mark for 
socks that could, in fact, develop holes.241 Would consumers believe the 
claim in the mark? One court held that they would not.242 Similarly, the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board held that consumers would never believe 
the claim in the mark GEORGE WASHINGTON ATE HERE for a restau-
                                                                                                                           
 235 See In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (setting forth three-part test 
for determining deceptiveness of mark). 
 236 See In re E5 LLC, 103 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1578, 1584 (T.T.A.B. 2012) (holding the term 
CU to be misdescriptive of a dietary supplement). 
 237 See id. 
 238 See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Breathasure, Inc., 204 F.3d 87, 97 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 239 See Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and Mis-
leadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 227, 233–38 (2007) (reciting 
examples of cases where falsity in advertising claim is not always clear). 
 240 See Glendale Int’l Corp. v. USPTO, 374 F. Supp. 2d 479, 486 (E.D. Va. 2005) (comment-
ing that “the PTO must rely, as it did here, on sources of publicly-available information likely to 
reflect such perceptions and, of course, common sense” in making a determination relating to 
deceptiveness of a mark); Humanetics Corp. v. Neways, Inc., 2004 WL 763935, at *7–9 (T.T.A.B. 
Mar. 31, 2004); Tushnet, supra note 239, at 236. 
 241 See Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Wallach Bros., 172 F. 859, 860 (2d Cir. 1909). 
 242 Id. (“No one surely could be misled into the belief that holes will not appear in complain-
ant’s socks if they are worn long enough, and it is difficult to conceive that any one could be fatu-
ous enough to suppose that by the use of such a word he could deceive people by inducing a belief 
that the goods to which it was applied would never wear out.”). 
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rant.243 By contrast, one court held that consumers would believe that the 
mark TITANIUM for recreational vehicles indicates that the vehicles were 
in fact made of Titanium, as contrasted with consumer beliefs about the 
marks SILVER or GOLD for other vehicles.244 Consider CAFETERIA as a 
mark for a sit-down restaurant. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board held 
that the misdescription in CAFETERIA would affect consumers’ purchasing 
decision for the restaurant’s services.245 Thus, reasonable minds might differ 
as to whether consumers would believe a claim in a mark and whether that 
belief would affect consumers’ purchasing decisions. 
A further example may help illustrate the subjective nature of deter-
mining deception. Consider the above example referring to THE NATIVE 
AMERICANS as a mark for a football franchise. The mark would be de-
ceptive in the trademark context only if that mark misdescribes the team 
(what if at its inception four players on the team actually were Native 
American?);246 only if consumers would understand the mark to be describ-
ing the team (might consumers believe that NATIVE AMERICANS repre-
sents a mere comparison to the team?); and only if consumers would refrain 
from purchasing football tickets upon learning that the team has no Native 
American players (if tickets sell out, does that suggest that consumers do 
not refrain?). The seemingly objective inquiry into deception may well call 
for subjective opinion. Thus, the anti-disparagement criterion does not ap-
pear to call for subjective opinion any more than the anti-deception criteri-
on. 
One might further argue, however, that deceptive speech is unprotected 
by the First Amendment, so even if the anti-deception criterion is viewpoint 
discriminatory, the viewpoint discrimination does not violate the First 
Amendment. That argument, however, is not correct. Although it is true that 
deceptive speech is not protected in the commercial-speech context, decep-
tive speech does receive some protection outside that context.247 That fact is 
                                                                                                                           
 243 In re George Washington Ate Here, Inc., 167 U.S.P.Q. 702, 1970 WL 9634 (T.T.A.B. 
1970); see also In re One Minute Washer Co., 95 F.2d 517 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (holding that consum-
ers would never believe that a washing machine could wash clothes in one minute—as opposed to 
the machine’s actual time of seven minutes—based on the mark, ONE MINUTE). 
 244 See Glendale Int’l Corp., 374 F. Supp. 2d at 484–87. 
 245 See In re ALP of South Beach Inc., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1009, 2006 WL 936984 (T.T.A.B. 
2006). 
 246 See Snyder, supra note 83 (“On that inaugural Redskins team, four players and our Head 
Coach were Native Americans.”). 
 247 See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (“[T]he leeway for untruthful or 
misleading expression that has been allowed in other contexts has little force in the commercial 
arena.”); see also, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–73 (1964) (recognizing the 
inherent constitutional need to protect false statements on the grounds that “[t]hat erroneous 
statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression 
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important because where speech is protected in one context, switching con-
texts does not justify viewpoint discrimination of that speech.248 The anti-
deception criterion does not represent justifiable viewpoint discrimination. 
Because the majority’s reason for concluding that the anti-disparagement 
criterion is viewpoint discriminatory suggests that the anti-deception crite-
rion is also viewpoint discriminatory, the majority’s reasoning is suspect. 
B. Viewpoints of the Referenced Group 
The Tam majority further reasoned that the disparagement criterion is 
not viewpoint neutral because the criterion depends on a viewpoint of a 
substantial composite of the referenced group.249 The criterion cannot be 
viewpoint neutral, the majority argued, if denial of trademark registration 
turns solely on the viewpoint of a group.250 The majority stated: “The gov-
ernment’s argument also fails because denial of registration under [the anti-
disparagement criterion] turns on the referenced group’s perception of a 
mark.”251 The majority thus reasoned that one group’s perception of the 
mark implies that the government denies protection based on a view-
point.252 
This reasoning does not make sense in the context of trademark law. 
Once again, the reasoning of the majority calls into question the fundamen-
tal provision in the Lanham Act that bars protection for deceptive marks.253 
As stated above, in determining whether a mark is deceptive, the PTO must 
determine whether a misdescriptive mark affects the purchasing decisions 
of a relevant consumer group.254 Unsurprisingly, in making this distinction, 
the PTO must consider perceptions of the consumer group to determine 
whether the misdescription affects purchasing decisions.255 A mark’s eligi-
bility under the anti-deception criterion depends on a group’s viewpoint of a 
                                                                                                                           
are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they need to survive” (quotations omitted) (citations omit-
ted)). 
 248 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387–88, 391. Notably, switching contexts can justify subject-
matter content discrimination. See id. In the commercial-speech framework, only general classes 
of content may be proscribed (and only for good reason), not viewpoints of otherwise protected 
expression. See id. Hence, the fact that deceptive speech is protected in some contexts but not 
protected in the commercial-speech context implies that deceptiveness represents a general cate-
gory of content—not a viewpoint. See id. 
 249 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1337. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. 
 252 See id. 
 253 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012). 
 254 See In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d at 775. 
 255 See, e.g., In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1048.  
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proposition.256 If the misdescription matters to the group, just like if the dis-
paragement matters to the group, trademark is denied.257 So under the ma-
jority’s reasoning, the anti-deception criterion would be viewpoint discrimi-
natory and thereby unconstitutional. 
The same can be said of marks that require secondary meaning for 
trademark protection. Secondary meaning requires the PTO to assess 
whether a select group of the public—consumers of the good in question—
perceives a mark as describing the source of the good rather than describing 
an attribute about the good itself.258 That is, to acquire distinctiveness nec-
essary for trademark protection of descriptive marks,259 the PTO must de-
termine whether consumers of that good perceive the mark to be indicating 
a brand as opposed to describing an attribute of the good.260 Secondary 
meaning turns entirely on the viewpoint of the relevant consumer pool.261 
Therefore, under the majority’s rationale—that viewpoint discrimination oc-
curs where a criterion depends on a group’s viewpoint—the Lanham Act’s 
requirement that descriptive marks must have secondary meaning would be 
viewpoint-discriminatory content discrimination.262 
In sum, the reasoning that the majority employs to conclude that the an-
ti-disparagement criterion is viewpoint discriminatory calls into question fun-
damental doctrines in trademark law. Its reasoning suggests that the Lanham 
Act’s exclusion of deceptive marks and the Act’s requirement of secondary 
meaning both constitute viewpoint-discriminatory rules. The very suggestion 
of such a conclusion calls into doubt the majority’s reasoning. 
IV. VAGUENESS 
The Tam majority cited uncertainty in the application of the anti-
disparagement criterion as a reason supporting its conclusion of unconstitu-
tionality.263 No one can say with any degree of certainty what is considered 
                                                                                                                           
 256 See, e.g., id. at 1053–54 (finding that purchasers and prospective consumers are likely to 
believe that SUPER SILK describes fabric as comprising silk material). 
 257 See id. 
 258 See PaperCutter, Inc. v. Fay’s Drug Co., 900 F.2d 558, 564–65 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 259 Other content-based categories of marks, such as marks that are primarily a surname or 
primarily geographically descriptive, also require secondary meaning. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)–(f) 
(2012). 
 260 See PaperCutter, 900 F.2d at 564–65. 
 261 See, e.g., King-Size, Inc. v. Frank’s King Size Clothes, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1138, 1158 
(S.D. Tex. 1982) (denying trademark protection for lack of secondary meaning on the grounds that 
the proponent’s evidence did not address the proper pool of consumers). 
 262 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1337. 
 263 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 1587871 
(U.S. Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 15-1293). 
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disparaging to a particular group of persons, especially when views and us-
ages may change over time.264 The anti-disparagement criterion is therefore 
unpredictable in its application.265 Arguably, then, the criterion is vague266 
and overbroad.267 The majority explained: 
The uncertainty as to what might be deemed disparaging is not 
only evident on its face, given the subjective-reaction element and 
shifting usages in different parts of society. It is confirmed by the 
record of PTO grants and denials over the years, from which the 
public would have a hard time drawing much reliable guidance 
                                                                                                                           
 264 See id. 
 265 See id. 
 266 The Supreme Court has explained the vagueness doctrine as follows: 
[T]he void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due 
process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is required of them 
so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so that 
those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way. When 
speech is involved, rigorous adherence to those requirements is necessary to ensure 
that ambiguity does not chill protected speech. 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (citations omitted). 
 267 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1358 (O’Malley, J., concurring) (arguing that the anti-
disparagement criterion is unconstitutional on vagueness grounds). The Supreme Court has ex-
plained the overbreadth doctrine as follows: 
[S]tatutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights 
must be narrowly drawn and represent a considered legislative judgment that a par-
ticular mode of expression has to give way to other compelling needs of society. As 
a corollary, the Court has altered its traditional rules of standing to permit—in the 
First Amendment area—attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that 
the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulat-
ed by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity. Litigants, therefore, are 
permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are 
violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very 
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally pro-
tected speech or expression. 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1973) (quotations omitted) (citations omitted). 
 The majority’s choice not to apply the exceptional free-speech frameworks of commercial 
speech or government subsidies in its evaluation of the anti-disparagement criterion is necessary 
for the majority’s overbreadth argument. The overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial 
speech. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496–97 
(1982) (“[T]he overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech.”); Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 n.20 (1978) (“Commercial speech is not as likely to be de-
terred as noncommercial speech, and therefore does not require the added protection afforded by 
the overbreadth approach.”). Likewise for speech affected by government subsidies, the Court has 
observed “[i]n the context of selective subsidies, it is not always feasible for Congress to legislate 
with clarity.” Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 589 (1998). 
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. . . . [T]he uncertainty here . . . contributes significantly to the 
chilling effect on speech.268 
For Judges O’Malley and Wallach, who concurred with the majority, 
the uncertainty of its application was even more of a constitutional prob-
lem.269 Judge O’Malley described the anti-disparagement criterion as “so 
vague that I would find it to be unconstitutional, whether or not it could 
survive Appellant’s First Amendment challenge.”270 
The judges’ discomfort with the uncertainty surrounding the anti-
disparagement criterion is understandable. Uncertainty with respect to the 
anti-disparagement criterion’s application is clearly problematic. The uncer-
tainty in that doctrine, however, is no more of a problem than the uncertain-
ty that exists in applying several other doctrines in trademark law.271 If un-
certainty in application of rules that affect trademark rights to expression 
were sufficient to find the rule unconstitutional, trademark law could not 
exist.272 Simply put, uncertainty must exist in view of the nature of the task 
that trademark undertakes, namely, the task of assigning property rights to 
speech based on contextual meaning. Indeed, it is well established that de-
termining whether a mark qualifies for trademark protection often requires 
subjective judgment calls over which reasonable minds disagree.273 
As support for the claim that trademark is fraught with uncertainty, this 
section describes other instances of uncertainty surrounding the question of 
                                                                                                                           
 268 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1341–42. 
 269 See id. at 1358–63 (O’Malley, J., concurring). 
 270 Id. at 1358. 
 271 The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that a criterion for trademark protection 
which yields uncertainty in application should not receive protection. In 1995, in Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Products Co., the Court rejected the argument as follows: 
[Respondent] says that, if the law permits the use of color as a trademark, it will 
produce uncertainty and unresolvable court disputes about what shades of a color a 
competitor may lawfully use. Because lighting (morning sun, twilight mist) will af-
fect perceptions of protected color, competitors and courts will suffer from “shade 
confusion” as they try to decide whether use of a similar color on a similar product 
does, or does not, confuse customers and thereby infringe a trademark. [Respondent] 
adds that the “shade confusion” problem is “more difficult” and “far different from” 
the “determination of the similarity of words or symbols.” 
We do not believe, however, that color, in this respect, is special. Courts traditional-
ly decide quite difficult questions about whether two words or phrases or symbols 
are sufficiently similar, in context, to confuse buyers. 
514 U.S. 159, 167 (1995). 
 272 See Tushnet, supra note 1, at *33 (recognizing inconsistencies in application of the anti-
disparagement criterion but arguing that “vagueness is also a huge problem with the rest of the 
bars, which can be equally unpredictable”). 
 273 See infra notes 274–299 and accompanying text (providing other examples in trademark 
law of uncertainty surrounding eligibility for trademark registration). 
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trademark eligibility. One obvious instance is the application of doctrine 
that distinguishes between categories of marks.274 The distinctions between 
mark categories determine whether a mark may receive trademark protec-
tion automatically, may receive it only with an evidentiary showing that 
establishes secondary meaning, or may never receive protection.275 These 
categories were originally set forth by Judge Henry Friendly of the Second 
Circuit, who noted the uncertainty inherent in distinguishing between the 
categories: 
The lines of demarcation, however, are not always bright. Moreo-
ver, the difficulties are compounded because a term that is in one 
category for a particular product may be in quite a different one 
for another, because a term may shift from one category to anoth-
er in light of differences in usage through time, because a term 
may have one meaning to one group of users and a different one 
to others, and because the same term may be put to different uses 
with respect to a single product.276 
Consider the distinction between two categories of marks: suggestive 
and descriptive.277 Under the Lanham Act, marks that suggest a characteris-
tic of the good automatically receive trademark protection; marks that mere-
ly describe a characteristic of the good do not.278 In theory, a suggestive 
mark requires a mental inference to understand that the mark is suggesting 
an attribute of the good, whereas a descriptive mark immediately conveys 
an attribute of the good.279 In practice, the application of the theory yields 
unpredictable outcomes; the line between suggestive and descriptive marks 
seems illusory.280 For instance, is the mark COZY-WARM ENERGY SAV-
ERS descriptive or suggestive for pajamas? The Second Circuit held it to be 
descriptive.281 Or what about ACTION SLACKS for slacks designed for 
                                                                                                                           
 274 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 275 See id. 
 276 Id. 
 277 See id. 
 278 Descriptive marks may receive protection if its proponent can demonstrate secondary 
meaning. See id. 
 279 See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790–91 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 280 See Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 1985) (recognizing the 
lack of a clean boundary line between descriptive and suggestive marks). 
 281 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1984). The 
Second Circuit’s reasoning in this case well illustrates the utter uncertainty involved in assessing 
whether a mark is descriptive or suggestive: 
Had this suit been brought before the energy crisis, we might well have concluded 
that the mark was suggestive. But by the time of the alleged infringement, “Cozy 
Warm ENERGY-SAVERS” fell on the descriptive rather than the suggestive side of 
 
2016] Free Speech & Disparaging Trademarks 1687 
movement? The Trademark Board held it to be suggestive.282 Or WEEK-
AT-A-GLANCE for a weekly appointment book? The court held it to be 
suggestive.283 
Judge Learned Hand has observed the principle for distinguishing be-
tween suggestive and descriptive marks as follows: “It is quite impossible to 
get any rule out of the cases beyond this: That the validity of the mark ends 
where suggestion ends and description begins.”284 Other federal circuits have 
recognized the uncertainty surrounding the distinction between suggestive 
and descriptive marks.285 For instance, the Federal Circuit has stated: 
In the complex world of etymology, connotation, syntax, and 
meaning, a term may possess elements of suggestiveness and de-
scriptiveness at the same time. No clean boundaries separate these 
legal categories. Rather, a term may slide along the continuum be-
                                                                                                                           
a shifting line and as such was not entitled to protection absent proof of secondary 
meaning . . . . Numerous clothing businesses and hundreds, if not thousands, of oth-
er businesses as a result of the energy crisis began using “energy saving” and “cozy 
warm” to describe or extol the virtues of their products. In the wake of this common 
usage, the public was so well educated to the concept of something “cozy warm” as 
an “energy saver” that consumers did not have to engage in any sort of multistage 
reasoning process to link the term to the virtues of any number of products, includ-
ing but not limited to flannel pajamas and nightgowns. 
Id. 
 282 Levi Strauss & Co. v. R. Josephs Sportswear Inc., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1464, 1993 WL 444262 
(T.T.A.B. 1993). 
 283 Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 96, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) (“[T]he trademark Week-At-A-Glance does not describe the format, contrary to the asser-
tion of [Defendant]. As the testimony established, a weekly appointment book can have one week 
on each page, one week spread over two pages, or a shorter period of time such as five or four 
days spread over two pages.”). 
 284 Franklin Knitting Mills v. Fashionit Sweater Mills, 297 F. 247, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), aff’d, 
4 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1925) (per curiam). 
 285 The Second Circuit has recognized the amorphous distinction between suggestive and 
descriptive marks: 
It cannot be gainsaid that the judiciary is ill-equipped to distinguish between the de-
scriptively suggestive and the suggestively descriptive mark. In addition, societal vi-
cissitudes demand that the categories retain fluidity to accommodate a particular 
mark’s evolving usage over time. Moreover, the determination whether a mark is 
descriptive or suggestive cannot be made in a vacuum; it is necessary to surmise the 
mental processes of those in the marketplace at whom the mark is directed. 
Thompson Med. Co., 753 F.2d at 213 (quotations omitted) (citations omitted); see also Zatarains, 
Inc., 698 F.2d at 790 (“These categories, like the tones in a spectrum, tend to blur at the edges and 
merge together. The labels are more advisory than definitional, more like guidelines than pigeon-
holes.”); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Whether Slickcraft is 
suggestive or descriptive is a close question. The line separating the two is uncertain; extrapolat-
ing the line from precedent would be impossible . . . . [T]he distinction between descriptive and 
suggestive marks may be inarticulable . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
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tween suggestiveness and descriptiveness depending on usage, 
context, and other factors that affect the relevant public’s percep-
tion of the term.286 
Hence, courts and the PTO are ill equipped to distinguish between sugges-
tive and descriptive marks, and as a consequence, the application of the 
standard yields great uncertainty. 
This is only the beginning. The PTO must distinguish between marks 
that are arbitrary (arbitrary marks have a meaning that bears no relationship 
to the meaning of the good),287 deceptive (deceptive marks inaccurately de-
scribe a good, consumers believe the misdescription, and the misdescription 
affects the purchasing decision),288 and deceptively misdescriptive (decep-
tively misdescriptive marks inaccurately describe a good, and consumers 
believe the misdescription, but the misdescription does not affect the pur-
chasing decision).289 Arbitrary marks automatically receive protection; de-
ceptive marks never receive protection; and deceptively misdescriptive 
marks receive protection only by showing secondary meaning.290 For in-
stance, if a shoe manufacturer uses the mark, MAGNETIC, to sell a line of 
tennis shoes that are not in fact magnetic, the PTO must decide whether the 
mark is arbitrary, deceptive, or deceptively misdescriptive. If the PTO be-
lieves that consumers would not understand that MAGNETIC proposes that 
the shoe is in fact magnetic, then the mark would receive strong protection 
as an arbitrary mark. If the PTO believes that consumers would understand 
that MAGNETIC proposes that the shoe is in fact magnetic and further be-
lieves that this understanding would affect consumers’ purchasing decision, 
the term is deceptive, thereby ineligible for trademark protection. If the 
PTO believes that consumers would understand that MAGNETIC proposes 
that the shoe is in fact magnetic but that the misdescription would not affect 
consumers’ purchasing decisions, the term is deceptively misdescriptive and 
is therefore eligible for trademark protection upon a showing of secondary 
meaning. Which type of mark is MAGNETIC for shoe sales? Reasonable 
                                                                                                                           
 286 In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 287 See Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 791 (explaining that arbitrary marks “bear no relationship to the 
products or services to which they are applied”). 
 288 See In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that for a good to 
be deceptive, it must misdescribe the good, prospective buyers must be “likely to believe” the 
misdescription, and the misdescription must be “likely to affect” the buyer’s decision to purchase 
the good). 
 289 See id.; In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95, 104–05 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (explaining that “if the 
public would perceive a misdescriptive use of a geographic name as a descriptive use, the claimed 
mark is deceptively misdescriptive and unregistrable without secondary meaning”). 
 290 See In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d at 104–05. 
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minds may disagree. The shoe producer would thereby face uncertainty as 
to whether its mark is eligible for protection. 
Many more examples of uncertainty could be cited. Consider the fol-
lowing inquiries that raise uncertainty in determining whether a trademark 
applicant will receive rights: (1) the inquiry into whether a mark is descrip-
tive or generic;291 (2) the inquiry into whether trade dress constitutes prod-
uct packaging or product design;292 (3) the inquiry into whether a once-
distinctive mark has become generic;293 (4) the inquiry into whether a mark 
has gained secondary meaning;294 (5) the inquiry into whether a geographic 
                                                                                                                           
 291 If a mark describes the good itself, rather than a characteristic of a good, the mark is gener-
ic, incapable of ever receiving trademark protection. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9–11. Yet if a 
mark describes a characteristic of the good, the mark is merely descriptive, capable of receiving 
trademark protection upon a showing of secondary meaning. For example, is the word Cola de-
scriptive of the beverage product, or alternatively, is Cola generic so as to describe a class of 
products? See Dixi-Cola Labs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F.2d 352, 359 (4th Cir. 1941) (“[T]he 
word ‘cola’ does not today indicate the plaintiff’s product [Coca-Cola] but a class of drinks to 
which the goods of the defendants and many other competitors belong.”). Courts must distinguish 
between descriptive or generic, which the Second Circuit has called a “chimerical line.” Thomp-
son Med. Co., 753 F.2d at 213 n.8 (“[B]ecause generic marks cannot be protected even upon a 
showing of secondary meaning, courts increasingly have been called upon to delineate the chimer-
ical line between the descriptive and the generic.”). 
 292 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000) (“There will 
indeed be some hard cases at the margin: a classic glass Coca–Cola bottle, for instance, may con-
stitute packaging for those consumers who drink the Coke and then discard the bottle, but may 
constitute the product itself for those consumers who are bottle collectors, or part of the product 
itself for those consumers who buy Coke in the classic glass bottle, rather than a can, because they 
think it more stylish to drink from the former.” (emphasis added)). 
 293 Meanings change over time as the public changes its use of words: what was once a dis-
tinctive fanciful term that designated a brand of good may become a generic term over time. See 
Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding that fanciful mark Aspi-
rin has become generic and thereby lost trademark protection). The word cellophane once com-
municated brand, but it quickly became generic through public usage. See DuPont Cellophane Co. 
v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1936). What about Teflon? Has Teflon become a 
generic term for non-stick pans? According to one court, Teflon has not become generic. See E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). Rea-
sonable minds might disagree. What about Band-Aid, Xerox, and Lego? Needless to say, the pro-
tection that trademark offers for a mark can be very fluid, and thereby uncertain. 
 294 To show secondary meaning, a proponent must demonstrate that a mark has come to signi-
fy source in the minds of consumers. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 211 (“[I]n the minds 
of the public, the primary significance of a [mark] is to identify the source of the product rather 
than the product itself.” (quotation omitted)). Given that the inquiry requires demonstration of 
minds of consumers, that inquiry raises uncertainty, especially given the multiplicity of sources 
that the PTO may weigh in making this determination. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, 
“[s]econdary meaning can be established in many ways, including (but not limited to) direct con-
sumer testimony; survey evidence; exclusivity, manner, and length of use of a mark; amount and 
manner of advertising; amount of sales and number of customers; established place in the market; 
and proof of intentional copying by the defendant.” Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal 
Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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term is used in a non-descriptive, arbitrary sense;295 (6) the inquiry into 
whether a personal name requires secondary meaning;296 and (7) the inquiry 
into whether trade dress is functional.297 Each of these inquiries requires an 
examination of content to conclude whether an applicant will receive pro-
tection. Each introduces great uncertainty. Consequently, a potential mar-
kholder may avoid content that would raise one of these inquiries.298 A po-
tential markholder cannot express her identity using content that would 
raise any of these inquiries if she desires the security of knowing that she 
will receive the benefits of a registered trademark. Under the majority’s rea-
soning, such uncertainty represents a chilling of speech to be avoided.299 
Under well-established doctrine and trademark law precedent, the chilling is 
entirely constitutional. 
The upshot of this discussion is that uncertainty in determining mar-
kholder rights is part and parcel with the trademark system. The fact that the 
anti-disparagement criterion yields uncertainty in application is consistent 
with other content-based trademark doctrines that determine the rights of 
markholders. If the anti-disparagement criterion is unconstitutional because 
of its uncertainty in application, so is the rest of trademark law. 
                                                                                                                           
 295 In In re Fred Gretsch Co., the Trademark Examiner refused to register Nashville as a mark 
for a guitar and amplifier on the grounds that the goods did not derive from the city Nashville. 159 
U.S.P.Q. 60, 1968 WL 8164 (T.T.A.B. 1968). The mark, the Examiner held, would be deceptively 
misdescriptive, which would require a showing of secondary meaning. Id. On appeal, the Trade-
mark Board reversed, holding Nashville to be a suggestive term that called to mind a country style 
of music played on the guitar. Id. 
 296 See Peaceable Planet, Inc. v. Ty, Inc., 362 F.3d 986, 988–92 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding 
that markholder did not need to show secondary meaning for registration of the name Niles, de-
spite trademark law’s requirement that secondary meaning must be shown for personal names). 
 297 See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 165 (“[I]n general terms, a product feature is functional, and 
cannot serve as a trademark, if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the 
cost or quality of the article, that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a sig-
nificant non-reputation-related disadvantage.” (quotation omitted)). 
 298 These inquiries concern only the acquisition of rights. There is of course additional uncer-
tainty surrounding the enforcement of rights, which would also raise speech concerns under the 
majority’s reasoning. Second speakers of marks have a First Amendment right to express the mark 
in a way that is not infringing. Yet the question of infringement is anything but clear. To say the 
least, the eight-factor test for infringement raises subjective considerations. See Polaroid Corp. v. 
Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (articulating test to determine infringement 
as consideration of “the strength of his make, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the 
proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, 
and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s 
product, and the sophistication of the buyers”). Second speakers’ protected speech may therefore 
be chilled by the uncertainty surrounding infringement. 
 299 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1341–42. 
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CONCLUSION 
In In re Tam, the majority set out to prove that the anti-disparagement 
criterion was unconstitutional. Its proof failed on four grounds. First, the 
majority failed to analyze the criterion under an exceptional free-speech 
framework that would have enabled greater discretion for the government to 
exercise content-based discrimination. This failure was based on an incor-
rect premise, i.e., that the disparaging element of a mark is expressive, 
whereas the source-identifying element of a mark is not. The premise is 
simply not true. By identifying the source of a mark, the markholder is ex-
pressing the way in which consumers should conceive of the source as well 
as any additional meaning that consumers should associate about the 
source. Hence, the majority was incorrect to distinguish a disparaging ele-
ment from a source-identifying element on the basis of expressiveness. 
Both elements are expressive. Accordingly, any content-based criterion that 
targets either element of a mark—disparagement or source-identification—
must be analyzed under the same free-speech framework. The distinctive-
ness criterion targets the source-identification element, and the only way for 
the distinctiveness criterion to be constitutional is for it to be analyzed un-
der an exceptional free-speech framework. Therefore, the anti-
disparagement criterion must also be analyzed under an exceptional free-
speech framework. 
Related to the issue of framework, the majority was incorrect to ana-
lyze the anti-disparagement criterion under a strict-scrutiny standard of re-
view. The same standard of review must apply to both the anti-
disparagement criterion and any government restrictions on expressions of 
self-identification, for both the criterion and any such restriction target 
speech protected by the First Amendment. Yet applying a strict-scrutiny 
standard to restrictions on expressions of self-identification would erase 
trademark law altogether. Trademark law inherently restricts speakers from 
identifying themselves by expressing a mark that someone else has already 
registered. Indeed, trademark law amounts to content-based restrictions of 
self-identification. Hence, for trademark law to be able to perform its con-
tent-discriminatory function, trademark law must be analyzed under a 
standard of review that is less stringent than strict scrutiny. That would in-
clude the anti-disparagement criterion. 
Second, the majority failed to recognize that the anti-disparagement 
criterion supports the purpose of trademark law. This failure was based on 
an incorrect premise, namely, that the purposes of trademark law are limited 
to prevention of consumer confusion and preserving markholder goodwill. 
Those purposes are not the end of trademark law. They are means for 
achieving broader purposes, which includes promoting the collective mar-
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ketplace and its efficient operation. The anti-disparagement criterion sup-
ports these broader purposes. Specifically, the criterion fosters consumer 
confidence in commercial transactions, such that consumers will not refrain 
from entering transactions simply because they disagree with a disparaging 
opinion. Likewise, the criterion discourages markholder goodwill for goods 
that could be detrimental to the marketplace or society generally. 
Third, the majority failed to recognize that the anti-disparagement cri-
terion is viewpoint neutral. The reasoning that the majority employed to 
reach its conclusion implies that trademark’s anti-deception criterion is 
viewpoint discriminatory. Like the anti-disparagement criterion, the anti-
deception criterion targets only one type of viewpoint—those that are de-
ceptive—and it calls for a high level of subjectivity in its application. 
Moreover, like the anti-disparagement criterion, the anti-deception criterion 
relies on viewpoints of a group. Hence, to the extent that the anti-
disparagement criterion is viewpoint discriminatory, the anti-deception cri-
terion must also be, and that is absurd. 
Fourth, the majority relied on the fact that uncertainty surrounds the 
application of the anti-disparagement criterion. Yet trademark law is fraught 
with uncertainty. Any of its standards for determining eligibility require 
subjective judgment over which reasonable minds often disagree. The anti-
disparagement criterion is no different. 
Thus, the context of trademark law exposes serious flaws in the major-
ity’s reasoning. Those flaws indicate a fundamental misunderstanding of 
trademark law, and for that matter, speech law as well. But more than that, 
the flaws suggest a much bigger problem. In addition to creating inconsist-
encies in trademark law, the majority has overturned a century of practice 
and decades of precedent. Simply put, neither reason, practice, nor prece-
dent supports the majority. Indeed, the whole picture begins to look very 
different from a court undertaking its duty to protect free speech. It begins 
to look like a court imposing its view that Congress should not make laws 
reflecting moral judgment.300 It begins to look viewpoint discriminatory. 
                                                                                                                           
 300 See id. at 1338 (criticizing the anti-disparagement criterion on the grounds that its applica-
tion requires “moral judgments”). 
